

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050050-9

26 FEBRUARY 1980      POLIT - (FOUO 5/80) - RF      1 OF 1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050050-9

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L78948

26 February 1980

# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 5/80)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

For further information on report content  
call (703) 351-2938 (economic); 3468  
(political, sociological, military); 2726  
(life sciences); 2725 (physical sciences).

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF  
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION  
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8948

26 February 1980

USSR REPORT  
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS  
(FOUO 5/80)

CONTENTS	PAGE
INTERNATIONAL	
Soviet Views on Current U.S. Foreign Policy Concepts (SOVREMENNYYE VNESHNE-POLITICHESKIYE KONTSEPTISII, 1979) .....	1
N. N. Inozemtsev on Soviet Foreign Policy (N. N. Inozemtsev; LENINSKIY KURS MEZHDUNARODNOY POLITIKI KPSS, 1978) .....	39
REGIONAL	
Book Analyzes Contemporary Muslim Preaching (MUSUL'MANSKAYA PROPOVED', 1978) .....	41
Book on 'Survivals' of Islam in Dagestan Reviewed (A. F. Tsyркun; OSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSSR, No 6, 1979) .....	46
Book on Working Class in Kirgiziya Reviewed (A. N. Vinogradov; OSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSSR, No 6, 1979) .....	49

- a -

[III - USSR - 35 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTERNATIONAL

SOVIET VIEWS ON CURRENT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPTS

Moscow SOVREMENNYYE VNESHNE-POLITICHESKIYE KONTSEPTISII (Current U.S. Foreign Policy Concepts) in Russian 1979 signed to press 10 Jan 79 pp 1-47, 382 pages

[Annotation, preface, table of contents and chapter I from book published under auspices of the Institute of the USA and Canada, edited by G. A. Trofimenko, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, Moscow, 1979, 3,450 copies, 365 pages]

[Text] Annotation

The book gives a critical analysis of current concepts in American foreign policy and international relations. It considers the link between these concepts and the practice of American foreign policy, including relations with the USSR.

Contents

Preface--by G. A. Trofimenko, Doctor of Historical Sciences.....	3
Chapter 1. American Ideas on International Relations in the '80s and '90s by A. A. Kokoshin, Candidate of Historical Sciences.....	11
1.1. Ideas of a "Five-Polar" World Structure.....	15
1.2. Ideas of a "Tripartite Community of Developed Countries".....	24
1.3. Variants of Systems of "Regional Multipolarity".....	32
1.4. The Polyarchaic Model.....	38
Chapter 2. The Search for New Approaches to Foreign Politics by V. V. Shimanovskiy, Candidate of Historical Sciences....	48
2.1. In the Face of New Problems.....	48
2.2. Ideas of U.S. Adaptation to Real Conditions.....	57
2.3. Ideas on Force in International Relations.....	66
2.4. The Evolution of Washington's Official Platform.....	74
Chapter 3. The Evolution of American Military-Political Thought by G. A. Trofimenko, Doctor of Historical Sciences.....	85
3.1. Basic Characteristics of U.S. Military-Political Strategy.....	85
3.2. The Development of U.S. Strategy After World War II.....	90

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3.3.	The Realities of the '70s and U.S. Strategy.....	98
3.4.	U.S. Attempts to Achieve Partial Advantages in the Framework of Parity.....	102
3.5.	Strategic Ideas of President Carter's Administration.....	117
3.6.	Factors that Destabilize the Strategic Balance.....	124
3.7.	Limitation and Reduction of Arms as a Real Alternative to the Use of Force.....	131
Chapter 4.	American Ideas on Detente by P. T. Podlesnyy, Candidate of Historical Sciences.....	138
4.1.	The Clash of Differing Ideas on Detente.....	138
4.2.	Some Characteristics of American Ideas on Detente in the Second Half of the '70s.....	152
Chapter 5.	New Trends in the American Policy of "Crisis Reaction" (The Use of Force in Conflicts) by V. V. Zhurkin, Doctor of Historical Sciences.....	169
5.1.	Causes & Essence of Changes.....	169
5.2.	Corrections of the Mid '70s.....	172
5.3.	The Positive Influence of Detente.....	177
5.4.	Opponents of Detente & International Conflicts.....	179
5.5.	The Fight in Scientific Circles.....	180
5.6.	Ideas on the "Selective" Use of Force.....	185
5.7.	Ideologists of Negativism.....	192
5.8.	Advocates of a Constructive Approach.....	195
Chapter 6.	Non-Military "Elements of Force" in U.S. Foreign Policy by I. L. Sheydina, Candidate of Historical Sciences.....	199
6.1.	American Capital Abroad.....	209
6.2.	The Role of the U.S. as a Source of Innovations & "Know-How"...	212
6.3.	Export of Management.....	217
6.4.	The Foreign Policy Role of Transnational Corporations.....	224
6.5.	Ideas on "Political Trade".....	233
6.6.	Ideology as an "Element of Force".....	240
Chapter 7.	Changes in International Relations & the Evolution of U.S. Bourgeois Ideologists' Approach to Questions of the Ideological Struggle by D. V. Yermolenko, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences.....	247
7.1.	The Crisis of Bourgeois Consciousness as a Reflection of the General Crisis of Capitalism.....	247
7.2.	Revitalizing Ideology in Foreign Policy.....	251
7.3.	Plans for Exporting Anti-Communist Ideology Under Detente.....	258
7.4.	Efforts to Create a "New Foreign Policy Image" for American Capitalism.....	272
Chapter 8.	Current Trends in Studying Problems of Securing Peace by V. S. Anichkina, Candidate of Historical Sciences.....	279
8.1.	The Search for a New Conceptual Base for U.S. Foreign Policy...	286

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

8.2. Some "Findings" of U.S. Researchers in the Beginning of the '70s.....	290
8.3. Reversal from the "Cold War" to Detente & the "Theory of Peace".....	297
8.4. Working Out Paths to Peace Under Detente.....	304
Chapter 9. Global Problems of the Scientific-Technical Revolution & Their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy by G. S. Khozin, Candidate of Historical Sciences.....	
9.1. Food, Resources, Energetics.....	330
9.2. Environmental Protection.....	338
9.3. Conquering Space & the Pacific Ocean.....	345
Footnotes.....	365

## Preface

The goal the author's collective has set for itself in the present work is to give a critical analysis of the latest concepts of U.S. foreign policy, their strategy and U.S. approaches to the competition between the two social systems, to conflicts and their regulation under conditions of detente in international relations and the continuing deep restructuring of these relations. This restructuring is related to a weakening of the positions of imperialism and the stronger forces of socialism and the revolutionary and national liberation movement, to a deepening of the overall crisis of capitalism and to the aggravation of interimperialist contradictions. It is characterized by the increasingly widespread establishment on our planet of the principle of peaceful coexistence as a norm for interrelations among states with various social structures.

It is noted in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," that "In recent years we have managed to achieve a positive change in the development of international relations, a change from Cold War to detente, to the establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with various social structures in the practice of international life. The threat of a world-wide thermonuclear war has been averted. International conditions have become more favorable for peaceful socialist and communist construction and for the development of the peoples' struggle for social progress. The Soviet people have been working under peaceful conditions for more than thirty years. The international position of the USSR is firmer than ever. The international authority of the Octobrist homeland and of other socialist countries has become even greater."\*

\*"On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 31 January 1977, Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, p. 19.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It was not out of good will or their own inclinations that the leading capitalist states and the most powerful of them, the United States of America, came to a recognition of the principle of peaceful coexistence which the Soviet state had been steadily advancing since the first days of its existence, but because of the failure of the Cold War Policy which the United States and its allies considered to be an alternative to peaceful coexistence.

But this so-called alternative amounted to attempts to impose on the whole world a one-sided, purely imperialistic solution to problems, a solution which satisfied only the United States and its main allies in the military blocks. It not only did not solve a single truly world wide problem, not only did not strengthen foreign political positions of the proponents of this policy, but placed the world on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe. The belated recognition of this circumstance by the leaders of international, particularly American, imperialism led to a situation in which they turned from a policy aimed at remaking the world in keeping with their own ideas to a more realistic policy of adapting to the surrounding reality.

One of the first acts of this adaptation was the recognition by France, the FRG, Great Britain and the United States of the obvious circumstance that in a nuclear century there is no other basis for maintaining relations among states with various social structures than peaceful coexistence. This point has now been established in a number of bilateral agreements between socialist and capitalist countries and in multilateral international documents, particularly in the final document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which was signed in Helsinki by the heads of states and governments of 35 countries.

The adaptation to the new world situation, which was noted at the 24th CPSU Congress as an important feature of modern capitalism, is taking place both in the area of practice and in the area of theory, including in the concepts of foreign policy relations.

Analyzing the causes and effects of the failures of U.S. policy in the world arena, American theoreticians of these concepts try, by inventing new realities, to work out principles, methods and means of U.S. foreign political activity which would contribute to increasing the American states' "ability to compete" in the new situation or would at least prevent a deterioration of its international positions.

As a result of the activity of U.S. experts in international affairs who are employed in hundreds of scientific research institutes, universities and colleges, a certain "pool of ideas" regarding foreign policy questions has been formed. The ruling elite draws from it the concepts that suit them and seem promising. The enrichment of the state leadership with takes place not only this way but also as a result of the fact that in recent years experts in international relations are increasingly being enlisted directly in state service. This is more evidence of the fact that the



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ruling circles of the modern American bourgeoisie are trying as never before to take advantage of science to search for formulae for preserving the capitalist system by increasingly turning to social reformist activity within the country and to revision of their entrenched traditional foreign policy dogmas and concepts.

But the U.S. ruling class places bourgeois science in a truly irresolvable dilemma: it must develop proposals for adapting best to the new alignment of forces in the world arena and at the same time it must envision guarantees which, during the process of this adaptation, would make it possible to continue to pursue previous imperialist goals. It turns out, on the one hand, that bourgeois science in order somehow to approach reality, must recognize the weakening of the possibilities of American imperialism in the world arena and, on the other hand, it must give this same imperialism new instruments, new foreign policy "levers" which would strengthen its possibilities. And since various schools of theoreticians are working on various aspects of this dilemma, based on various approaches to its resolution which are to be found in the common "pool of ideas," foreign policy theories and concepts are distinguished by an unusually contradictory nature and sometimes are simply mutually exclusive.

The groupings of bourgeois theoreticians who think more realistically are trying to interpret more deeply the lessons of the recent past and are recommending that U.S. political leaders show restraint in foreign policy behavior, drawing attention primarily to the ways and means of peaceful regulation of disputes. Theoreticians of a more adventurist and militant type (and, unfortunately, these are in the majority since the U.S. "scientific establishment" is strongly connected with the military and industrial complex and depends on its generosity) are stubbornly clinging to the past political practice of American imperialism and are trying to find instruments of "politics of force" which would give the ruling circles the hope of restoring lost U.S. positions.

A large group of scientists who could justifiably be called "illusionists" (they include many sociologists and workers in the area of international relations) try, by abstracting from dominant tendencies to draw pictures of a bright future with the "renewal of western civilization."

One must say that the contradictions in American foreign policy, the zig-zags in the direction of detente, are explained not only by the internal political struggle within the United States itself regarding questions of restructuring their foreign policy, but also by the fact that the American leadership frequently moves from one foreign political concept to another, more "fashionable" one in the hope that the latter will ensure results that are more favorable for the United States.

Investigating the new foreign policy concepts of the United States, the authors of the monograph tried to single out precisely those problems which most fully reflect the development of the theoretical views which are re-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

flected or can be reflected in the practical policy of the United States. Here the authors proceed from the conviction that regardless of the degree of continuity in the U.S. foreign policy (since, in principle, this policy of theirs is formed on the broadest possible interparty basis), the very fact of the change in governmental administration in 1977, the transfer of executive power from the hands of the Republicans to the hands of representatives of the Democratic party, makes inevitable a certain adjustment in the course of U.S. foreign policy. And the events of 1977 and the first half of 1978 clearly confirm this. In the process of adjustment American foreign policy theory exerts no small influence on the development of Washington's practical foreign policy. This pertains especially to President Carter's administration because of two factors:

In the first place, many of the present high leaders of U.S. foreign and military policy are themselves representatives of the American academic elite or are close to it;

In the second place one should keep in mind that the American school of theoreticians of the so-called realistic policy which has been most fruitful in recent years has been closest to this present U.S. government which represents the Democratic Party.

The chapters of the present monograph give something like "cross-sections" of American foreign policy theory: concepts that pertain to the interpretation of the current condition of the world, including primarily relations between the United States and the USSR as well as their prospects and their future development; other global problems facing mankind and the possibilities of American influence on their resolution; ideas pertaining to normative statements of U.S. foreign policy which still foster the hope of the possibility of directing certain events along a pro-American course; and, finally, the latest propositions concerning instruments of U.S. influence, their degree of correlation among one another, and their practical utilization in various foreign political situations of the last quarter of the 20th century.

A number of points shared by the entire collective of authors runs through all chapters of the work. These include, above all, the authors' conviction that the main direction of the theoretical research of American experts in international relations now amounts to finding and implementing concepts which would ensure the "survival of western civilization" in the circumstances of the general crisis of capitalism, the colossal growth of the forces of socialism, the elimination of colonialism and the consolidation of the international positions of developing countries.

The majority of formulas of this kind suggested by western theoreticians revolve around the idea of organizing some kind of western "club" of industrially developed capitalist powers. According to these formulae, such a "club" would be responsible primarily for solving its own problems (internal economic and social instability, international finances, coordination of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

foreign and military policy, and so forth), and then to develop a coordinated solution to problems of interrelations with developing countries and with countries of socialism. In order to provide for the creation and functioning of such a "club" the majority of American theoreticians consider it necessary for the United States to change not only in words, but also in deeds its hegemonic approach to its capitalist allies and to demonstrate its readiness to act as equals with them in solving critical problems of the capitalist world.

Another idea that is always present in the work of many American theoreticians is the idea of the undesirability of nuclear war under modern conditions. Bourgeois theoreticians arrived at this conviction by various paths: some through the recognition of the barbarian, inhuman nature of such a war; others on the basis of pragmatic calculations which show that the strategic parity between the United States and the USSR which exists at the present time makes it hopeless and suicidal for the United States to use an instrument of nuclear war.

On the basis of the more or less unanimous opinion about the undesirability of nuclear war and the need to avoid it, academic circles of the United States are formulating and actively and broadly discussing a promising approach to problems of detente. The majority of American theoreticians consider detente a positive phenomenon which not only does not conflict with the interests of the United States, but, on the contrary, is the only possible course, the only realistic one for them in the modern "multipolar world." As for the specific ways and means of implementing the policy of detente, the limits of detente, the spheres of cooperation and the spheres where ideological, economic and other kinds of oppositions between the two systems remain, there is a wide range of opinions which is reflected in the corresponding sections of this book.

Very many U.S. foreign policy theoreticians see a panacea for saving and even strengthening U.S. foreign political positions in the so-called non-military factors of force engendered primarily by the results of the scientific and technical revolution. It is precisely with the help of such "factors of force" as exporting technology and "know how," modern managerial skills, the occupation of strong positions in the area of modern communications systems, transportation, information processing equipment and large undertakings in the area of mastering space and the world ocean that American leadership hopes to obtain a disproportionately great influence in solving global problems which are becoming increasingly crucial for mankind -- problems of energy resources, raw materials and foodstuffs.

In essence the thought of western theoreticians is tending more and more toward finding some form of coordinating the strong positions of the United States, western Europe and Japan in the area of the latest technical equipment and technology with the strong positions of developing countries which have natural resources that are in short supply and colossal reserves of manpower. Here American foreign political thought persistently points to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the need for immediately stepping up the activity of the West in this area and imposing its own solutions on the world while it still has the technical and industrial might, before the increasingly strong unity of world anti-imperialist forces makes the implementation of these plans impossible.

Another favorite idea of American theoreticians is that, despite a certain devaluation in the modern "geopolitical situation" of military force (including the military force of the United States itself), despite certain international documents that make it incumbent upon the states to refrain from using force or the threat of force in international relations, the factor of the threat of force must still remain in the arsenal of American foreign policy as a most important instrument of influence. Since the ruling circles of the United States think that when there is strategic parity the basic strategic nuclear force of the United States is not effective enough to be used directly against those who are still called the "main potential enemy" in the works of American theoreticians, the United States is steadily developing complicated conceptual schemes that are to reveal the process for using partial, "marginal" advantages of increasing this force or of using it for diplomatic "trade" pressure at the negotiations table. If Washington's policy which gave the United States the role of the world policeman is bankrupt (because of Washington's excessively zealous and "ill-considered" attitude toward the fulfillment of this role), is there not a possibility--American theoreticians think--of "selectively" acting with the help of "minor force" in various "peripheral" regions in order to accumulate certain strategic advantages.

Such are the general fundamental concepts that are most frequently encountered in the essays of modern U.S. foreign policy theoreticians.

The authors of the monograph think that, despite the "innovation" and "realistic nature" of a number of concepts, very many U.S. foreign policy theoreticians still live with the baggage of past years and are sustained by ideas of "American excellence", "imperial America" in a word all that that so typically embodies the "American dream" which is now having a kind of second birth in the United States, despite the complete lack of correspondence between surrounding reality and this chauvinistic "dream."

This illusion of "American excellence" and American omnipotence is, perhaps, the main obstacle to strengthening a truly realistic, sober approach to reality both in American theory and in U.S. foreign political practice. But, as the monograph shows, in American political science a certain amount of progress has still been made in the direction of a realistic stance as compared to those positions which the majority of its representatives held in the 1950's and 1960's.

The authors of the monograph hope that the research offered here will serve to provide the Soviet reader with a more profound familiarity with the process of the formation of modern U.S. foreign policy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 1. American Ideas on International Relations in the 1980's and 1990's.

It is not only the position it occupies in the system of existing international relations that is important for a state's foreign policy. A correct idea of the prospects for its evolution as well as of the general directions of change within the system of worldwide relations itself is also important.

Because of the fact that the United States is the leading state in the capitalist world, accounting for about 30 percent of the gross national product of the countries of the capitalist world, the question of the position and role of the United States in the future system of international relations as well as the interpretation by American scientists and politicians of this role and the prospects for its evolution are extremely important for predicting the foreign policy of the United States.

The goal in the area of a state's foreign policy, as in any other sphere of human activity, is the result of subjective ideas about the desired condition of one system of relations within whose framework this activity takes place. Additionally, when investigating the foreign policy of the American state it is important to reveal the true, and not simply the officially declared goals since these declarations frequently serve only as a decorous camouflage for the policy that is really being conducted.

In order to reveal these true goals and desires it is necessary first to analyze carefully the state's practical activity in the international arena. As for long-range goals, in addition to analyzing the general tendencies arising from the practice of implementing the bourgeois state's foreign policy, a good deal of advantage can also be gained by studying the views of bourgeois theoreticians of foreign policy. This is related to the fact that in the stage of the formation of the foreign policy under conditions where certain concepts have not yet become official doctrine and practice, theoreticians of the bourgeois state when determining its "national goals" must come to a fairly frank and frequently fairly pointed discussion in order to find the variants of the optimal strategy.

It is possible to single out the most representative directions from the totality of ideas, concepts and predictions of the development of the system of international relations that are presented in the works of American researchers. This can be done, first of all, in keeping with the principle of the attitude of one author or another or groups of authors toward the future role in the system of international relations of individual states that are participating in this system. When the analysis is more detailed it is important to classify various views with respect to the states and the various combinations of them which, according to these views, will determine the basis of the structure of international relations and the hierarchy of these relations.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In this stage the following approaches of American bourgeois authors to the future system of international relations are outlined:

variants on the theme of the "five-power" structure which presupposes the existence in the world of five main "centers of power" which determine international relations;

variants on the structure of international relations which divide states into two major groups of three;

various variants of a "multipolar" with a significant number of "regional centers of force" and a developed "multilayered" hierarchy;

variants of the "polyarchichal system" of even more complex and confused configurations with ties and interests of an ever increasing number of subjects of international relations which overlap and interweave with one another.

In addition to the classification of predictions and concepts concerning the development of a system of international relations based on differences in the structure of the system, there is also another approach. It presupposes separating out the main axes of opposition in the world policy around which various groupings of states arrange themselves. In the works of bourgeois scholars there are, in particular, such lines of confrontation as the opposition between capitalist and socialist states ("East-West"), the struggle within the capitalist camp itself ("West-West"), analysis of the confrontation of "industrially developed powers" with developing countries on a non-ideological basis ("North-South"); a more complicated variant of this aspect of relations is the description of the situation in the form of a "triangle": "industrial democracies of the West" (including Japan)--"the communist world"--developing countries.

As for the role and position of the United States itself in one configuration of the future system of international relations or another, they are revealed in these constructs both directly and indirectly; the latter means that the future role of the U.S. can be determined by the role assigned to other subjects of world policy in one variant of the international system or another. This is expressed more directly in the evaluations from specialists of the degree of desirable activity of American foreign policy on the global and regional levels, the volumes of resources that can be allotted for implementing the foreign policy and also the evaluations of the relationships among various means and methods which can be used by the country's political leadership.

When considering these constructs of American foreign policy theoreticians it is most expedient to take as the initial axis the approach which is based on the classification of possible structures of international relations--differences in determining the number of major subjects of these relations, their relative power, degree of influence and so forth. The point

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

is that it is precisely one or another structure of the system of international relations that basically determines the processes and phenomena taking place in this system.

When analyzing these concepts, which at first glance seem extremely far from the daily routine of American policy and diplomacy, one must also not lose sight of the chain of intermediate elements that link the vision of the future world (and thus, as was already noted above, the long-range goals of the U.S. foreign political strategy) with the political goals and tasks of a lower level (in terms of both temporal and spatial parameters) and with the entire totality of the state's activity that is called foreign policy.

Proceeding from a Marxist-Leninist materialist understanding of history (including politics), when analyzing American predictions one should constantly keep in mind that they are subjective and arbitrary, based on bourgeois methodology, and, consequently, they are a distorted interpretation of those objective processes and phenomena which are taking place in international relations. At the same time the ideas of American scholars concerning the future of international relations and the condition of the world are still not a direct indication of what the U.S. foreign policy will actually be. So when approaching the subject of investigation of this chapter one should constantly be aware of the distinctions between:

the objective development of international relations (including the evolution of the economic and military potentials of individual states);

the reflection of this evolution in the awareness of bourgeois scholars and political activists who try to guess the future of international relations of the basis of analysis of objective tendencies;

the long-term foreign political planning, that is, the activity of the normative policy which consists, to a significant degree, in that, on the basis of selection of the optimal (from the point of view of one or another concrete grouping of the ruling class or leading circles as a whole) configuration of the future system of international relations they earmark and carry out goal-directed efforts of the state in the world arena which are intended to contribute to the evolution of international relations in the direction of the formation of precisely this configuration.

In addition to all that has been said once you take into account the fact that the ideas of the future system of international relations advanced by various American authors are in the stage of development it is as though they are being superimposed on one another. It frequently turns out that the authors of these ideas claim that they will be applicable for American foreign policy for a period of 7-10 years, but the ideas become outdated rapidly and can not keep up with the development of events even after 2 or 3 years.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

An effect is also produced by the struggle among various influential groups concerned with foreign political problems in the political arena within the United States--a struggle during whose course one idea or another is formed not as a result of opposition concerning questions that really relate to content and principles, but largely under the influence of competitive propagandistic influences.

#### Ideas of a "Five-Polar" World Structure

During the first third of the 1970's in the United States the prevailing discussion revolved around the idea advanced by certain bourgeois political scientists (in particular such as M. Kaplan, W. Kintner, H. Kissinger and others) concerning changing the system of international relations from a condition of "bipolarity" (that is, a struggle between the USSR and the United States and the groups of states headed by them) to a condition of "multipolarity." These authors assigned the roles of the main "characters" in this new structure to the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Western Europe (usually the nine countries forming the European Economic Community) and Japan. Around the variants of the "distribution of force and influence" among these major "centers of force" (taking into account their ability to attract developing countries to their side) a considerable number of American theoreticians also constructed their own variants of the future system of international relations.

One easily notes that this statement of the problem of the structure of international relations manifests the initial theoretical and methodological premises of many bourgeois political scientists who are following the traditions of the so-called school of political realism. It is typical of this area of bourgeois political theory to bring to the fore such a category as a state's "power" even though this concept is used separately from the main content of any political process. In other words, these scientists do not show a desire to look far enough beyond political phenomena to the patterns of socioeconomic development and class contradictions in the world and in individual countries.\* All this is inevitably reflected in their specific predictions and ideas as well.

\* For a more detailed critique of the ideas of the school of "political realism" see: "Amerikanskaya istoriografiya vneshney politiki SShA. 1945-1970" [American Historiography of U.S. Foreign Policy. 1945-1970], Moscow, Nauka, 1972, pp. 56-90; "Sovremennyye burzhuaaznyye teorii mezdunarodnykh otnosheniy. Kriticheskiy analiz" [Modern Bourgeois Theory of International Relations. A Critical Analysis], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, pp. 24-30; V. F. Petrovskiy, "American Foreign Political Thought," MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1976, pp. 74-92; H. S. Ytogi mknko, "SShA: politika, vojna, ideologiya" [The U.S.A.: Politics, War, Ideology], Moscow, Mysl', 1976, pp 121-127.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The differences that exist in the research of bourgeois authors concerning the future role of the United States in international relations pertain, first, to the number of "centers of power" that are singled out; second, their distribution in terms of their degrees of influence in various regions of the globe and third, the evaluation of the predominant form and means of foreign political influence of each of the main subjects of international relations.\*

As the first variation of the possible new system of international relations (whose appearance, in the views of a certain group of American political scientists, was projected approximately for the second half of the 1970's) one can consider the scheme of the five aforementioned counterbalancing "centers of power" which, according to the authors of this scheme, were to have had approximately equal influence in international affairs. The relative comparability of the influence of each of these major subjects of international relations was arrived at on the basis of predictions by a number of bourgeois authors concerning the strengthening of the military and political positions of Japan and Western Europe.\*\* For example, as W. Kintner (Director of the Institute of Foreign Political Research, Philadelphia) tries to show in his work, the aforementioned variant would signify a greater degree of stability in the entire system of international relations than it now has.

Supporting W. Kintner's reasoning, a professor at Chicago University, M. Kaplan, considers it a condition of the stability of this "five-polar" system of the world for each of the main "centers of power" to have sufficiently reliable strategic forces. This author supposes that this means that such strategic forces should be uncoordinated so that there will be an unconditional possibility of causing the enemy "unacceptable harm" through a counter ("second") attack. Still M. Kaplan recognizes that it will be an

\*It should be stipulated that the variants of the future system of international relations and the roles of the United States in them which are being analyzed in this work are presented in general form and do not include the directions of evolution of individual subsystems of the system of international relations.

\*\*It should be taken into account that these predictions were made back when Japan had initialed but had not ratified the Agreement on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Arms and the questions the creation of Japanese nuclear forces in the medium-range or long-range future was discussed with varying degrees of frankness not only in the U.S., but in Japan itself. True, the overwhelming majority of specialists, when evaluating Japan's scientific-technical and economic capabilities, expressed serious doubts and even an undoubtedly negative attitude toward the strategic and foreign political expediency of such a step. See, for example: Kasak, M., "Japan's Nuclear Option" in Superpowers in a Multinuclear World, Lexington, 1974, pp 91-103.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

extremely long time before the creation of such strategic forces for all three potential "centers of power" (Japan, Western Europe and China, especially if they develop independently without support from outside) and that only the Soviet Union and the United States will have such forces for a long time to come.<sup>1</sup>

Those who hold this view think, not without reason, that in such a system of international relations both Japan and the combined Western Europe would depend much less on the U.S. and therefore certain additional political problems would arise for the latter. Nonetheless such theoreticians think that under these conditions many elements positive for the U.S. would appear: these two "centers of power," with the corresponding American policy could remove part of the "burden" which the United States claims to bear throughout the world and would make it possible to reduce the degree of direct confrontation between the U.S., on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and China, on the other. This is what M. Kaplan writes in this connection (particularly about the future role of Western Europe which would have combined nuclear forces): "this Europe would undoubtedly play an independent role which would create both economic and political difficulties for the United States. On the other hand, such a nuclear Europe would lighten the U.S. burden of expenditures on the arms race, would help the Americans to solve a number of problems throughout the world and would reduce the possibility of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Moreover, such an independent and powerful Europe could become the only guarantee of Israel's survival and an important obstacle to transforming the Mediterranean Sea into a Soviet lake."<sup>2</sup>

These American authors actually do not camouflage their desire to achieve (with the help of the formation of the structure of international relations they propose) military and political encirclement of the Soviet Union. Interpreting in their own way the growing might and influence of the Soviet Union, they are achieving a return (although in changed, less Americanized form) to the idea of "restraining" the USSR.

This kind of task is also being set with respect to PRC. W. Kintner, in particular, asserts that in a "stable five-polar world," the "ambitions" of the Soviet Union and China will be limited because of a deep and all-pervasive conflict between them and also because of the fact that other "centers of power" will be located next to these countries: Western Europe--next to the Soviet Union; Japan--next to China and the USSR. "In the event of a bilateral conflict between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, China and Japan, the Soviet Union and Japan, both Western Europe and Japan will try to gain the support of the United States," asserts Kintner.<sup>3</sup>

From this idea of Kintner's it follows that in such a "five-polar" configuration of the world they intend to retain for the United States the role of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the major "center of influence" among the other conflicting and competing "centers of power."\*

The same role is also allotted to the model of the "tri-polar" structure of international relations which is supposed to be characteristic of the period from the end of the current decade until the beginning of the next one (USSR --USA--PRC).

During the period of transition from the "tri-polar" to the "five-polar" condition, American authors foresee the possibility of increased international instability which is fraught with new conflicts and critical situations. But this instability, according to their convictions, will be temporary and should not impede the transition of international relations to the more stable "five-polar" condition. Here they recommend only that one recognize the inevitability of a "transition period" and adapt American diplomacy to it as well as possible. Moreover certain American researchers try to emphasize that the main source of the instability during the "transition period" will be the strained relations between China and the Soviet Union. It should be noted that on the whole the judgements of American theoreticians and specialists concerning relations in the "triangle" and the "pentangle" are based on the idea that the confrontation between the PRC and the USSR will continue during the predicted period and they fairly consistently count on taking this into account as much as possible when implementing American foreign policy.

In this regard, the statement of the influential American senator R. Taft on the pages of the NEW YORK TIMES seems quite frank: "We must make it clearly understood that in the event of a struggle with the Soviet Union we will be prepared to render active diplomatic and material support to China . . . with the present alignment of forces in the world it is extremely necessary for divisions of the Chinese army to remain on the Soviet border."<sup>4</sup>

At the same time the shortcoming of the "tri-polar" balance of powers, in the opinion of a number of American researchers, consists in that the enlistment of the United States in "tri-polar" diplomacy can lead to undermining the "special" relations between the U.S. and their "natural allies." This U.S. policy, as J. Newhouse writes, will contribute to a peace similar to the peace of Palmerston's Great Britain, which "had no allies, but only

\*It should be stipulated immediately that the various American authors certainly do not all have the same attitude toward "stability." For example, the group of authors of the annual report of the Brookings Institute concerning U.S. national priorities draw the direct conclusion that the acquisition of nuclear arms by Japan and the FRG would undermine the influence of "moderate political groups" in these countries and would contribute to the growth of nationalism, which can disturb the stability of the international system in a direction that is clearly disadvantageous for the United States. (See, for example: Setting National Priorities, FY 1974, Washington, 1973 p 393).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

interests."<sup>5</sup> He thinks that under these conditions irreparable harm could come to U.S. relations with Japan and Western European NATO countries.

The lack of confidence on the part of the main American allies in the "tripolar" diplomacy conducted by the U.S., in the opinion of certain researchers, can be eliminated if the United States offers these states active assistance in the matter of creating powerful "independent" armed forces and also takes advantage of a complex of broader political-diplomatic and economic measures.

With respect to Japan M. Kapan wrote in 1973 that her independent acquisition of strategic offensive nuclear arms "will seem politically less useful in the next five years, unlikely in the subsequent ten years and almost natural in the following twenty years when the second postwar generation comes to power."<sup>6</sup>

Less categorical in his conclusions is the eminent specialist in Asian problems, R. Skalapino, who considers such a reversal in Japanese policy to be only one of the alternatives of what he calls the "policy of Gaulism on Japanese soil." He recognizes this policy of a Japan that is nationalistic, more active and independent of U.S. international activity to be extremely probable (although not at all necessarily related to her acquisition of nuclear weapons). Skalapino writes that with such a policy the question of nuclear arms can remain open for a long time if the Japanese government adopts the formula "acquisition of nuclear arms minus two." This means that, if necessary, Japan could create these weapons two years after a final decision about this has been made.<sup>7</sup>

American authors base the possibility of Japan's changeover to such a policy primarily on the idea that for her a military and political union with the U.S. is gradually losing importance and there are increasing doubts about the readiness of the U.S. to meet its commitments in Asia, especially after the defeat in the Vietnam war. It has also been pointed out that in the foreseeable future Japan can no longer continue to carry out its own economic expansion without creating significant armed forces.

In this connection Kintner wrote: "In the distant future it seems unlikely that Japan will rely exclusively on the United States in questions of her security. Is it possible for Japan to become even more powerful without acquiring commensurate armed forces. The alternative of unarmed neutrality is unlikely; it is considerably more possible that, with time, Japan will try to win an independent military position." Kintner also thinks that nuclear weapons could become the most important element of these independent forces of Japan."<sup>8</sup>

But what can be said about the degree of probability of the realization of the prediction about the formation in the 1980's and 1990's of a "pentangle" with a dominating role in the military and power relations among the "centers of power" that constitute it?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

One can assume that the idea of such a "five-polar" system of world politics is rather the result of imagination than of even a slightly scientific (even on the basis of bourgeois methodology) analysis of the future of international development and the development of individual countries participating in the world system of states.

The events of 1973-1977 showed that the predictions of the establishment of a "pentangular" world were not justified. In the 1970's, despite great difficulties and fairly frequent diversions, there has been development of the process of international detente, which leads to a reduction of military and political tension among the leading states of the world. Japan has not only not advanced along the path of acquiring nuclear arms, but, on the contrary, in 1976 ratified the Agreement of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In terms of its rates of development, western European economic and political integration is far behind all projections that were made earlier. It should be considered unlikely (no matter how desirable for many bourgeois scientists and U.S. political activists) that present Peking leaders will maintain such an unrealistic approach to Sino-Soviet relations --an approach which opposes the essential interests of the Chinese nation.

In the policy which American authors, from the standpoint of desirability of creating a "pentagonal" world, recommend for the United States can not be seen as anything but extremely irresponsible. Such a policy would undoubtedly oppose the interests of the Soviet Union which would be bound by another hostile encirclement and a more intensive strategic arms race. Taking into account the growing power and influence of the USSR, one can consider that the Soviet state would not allow the development of international relations to proceed along such a path.

Predictions of the establishment of a "five-polar" world and the corresponding recommendations for U.S. foreign political strategy, from the moment of their appearance, met with active criticism on the part of many eminent American international relations specialists.

The most well known were the arguments of Stanley Hoffman, a professor at Harvard University. His polemics with the authors considered above is so well developed and interesting that it deserves to be presented in detail.

Hoffman thinks that a system of political equilibrium based on several approximately equally significant "centers of power" was justified in the 18th and 19th centuries. "It was sufficiently flexible for maintaining 100 years of world peace after the Congress of Vienna, despite significant changes in the relative power and fates of the main active forces," writes Hoffman.<sup>9</sup> And here he considers the question of whether or not it is possible to create such a system under modern conditions, whether at the present time there is a tendency toward the formation of a new "balance of powers" on the "five-polar" basis discussed in the predictions considered above.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Hoffman thinks that the "balance of forces" doctrine is a model of "strategic-diplomatic behavior" in which the core of the foreign policy of each of the main states participating in the system of international relations is military force. Moreover this military force should be more or less equally distributed among the states. Only under these conditions can there be a balance of the "centers of power" when there are about five of them. But Hoffman goes on to note only two states--the USSR and the USA--are "world powers" which are involved in various kinds of problems everywhere in the world; and China is "still a regional power" and, because of her internal weaknesses, it will still be many years before she gains the ability to act in world politics on a level with the USSR and the USA although, in the eyes of certain people, she will be a potential superpower.

In Hoffman's opinion, there are no serious indications of the formation of two other "poles." Both Japan and Western Europe depend on the United States for military support. Despite their immense economic power, not a single one of these poles conducts itself on the strategic-diplomatic chessboard as it would if it intended to play a world role under the American "nuclear umbrella." Japan does not even have a clear-cut regional policy. Western Europe as a "consolidated center of power" is a "promise and not an actual political formation."<sup>10</sup>

Hoffman explains the impossibility of creating a mechanism of the "balance of powers" similar to the mechanism of the 19th century also by the changing nature of the foreign political power of the state under modern international conditions as compared to any other period in the past (which, in our view, is more important than the circumstances enumerated above). Hoffman thinks that military force with opposing parties acquiring nuclear weapons has lost its significance as a basic instrument in political expansion. It can not serve as a "regulator of balance" since to avoid an all-destructive nuclear war has become one of the main goals of the state's policy. Moreover, in Hoffman's opinion, in the foreseeable future the USSR and the USA will retain their overwhelming military superiority over all other states of the world. "The main mechanism of restraint," writes Hoffman, "will apparently retain its bipolar nature for a long time to come. Only the United States and the Soviet Union have the capability of destroying one another, while France, England and China can only cause serious harm to a superpower, but in so doing they will either subject themselves to complete annihilation or will cause irreparable losses."<sup>11</sup>

The danger, according to Hoffman, is that such a "five-polar" world could hardly be any more stable. He notes that perhaps on a strategic level of "five strategic forces," comparable in terms of this level could be "stable." Each "potential aggressor" would be restrained if not by the entire coalition, then by some third party that would provide a guarantee for a possible "victim" and by the forces of the "victim" itself. But, in Hoffman's opinion, the situation has this appearance only at first glance. When carefully considering this potential world one must take into account the fact that in strategic planning and military-political activity of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the States there is a good deal more indetermination which will constantly urge them to step up the arms race.

#### Ideas of a "Trilateral Community of Developed Countries"

Many other American authors have expressed and continue to express doubts about the probability of the realization of predictions concerning the appearance of a "five-polar" world what with the dominating influence of the military and strategic factor. Several other ideas about the future system of international relations are advanced in this connection. A certain part of the critics thus reject the idea of the appearance of five main "centers of power," but emphasize the lack of uniformity in the distribution of individual components of "power" among these centers. Thus, for example, a professor at the University of California, Robert Skalapino, Zbigniew Brzezinski--current assistant to President Carter for questions of national security who at one time held the post of director of the Institute of Problems of World Development (Columbia University)--and several other American authors have advanced the idea of two "power triangles": "military-political" made up of the USSR, the USA and the PRC, and the "political-economic," including Japan, the European Economic Community and the USA.

As was noted in the predictions at the beginning of the 1970's, Japan and the western European countries that are members of the EEC are capable of achieving a status of leading "centers of power" without exerting any significant efforts in the area of creating a strategic arms potential comparable to that of the USSR and the USA primarily on the basis of accelerated economic growth. It was asserted that the United States, even though it would surpass Japan and the EEC countries in terms of its economic power, would nonetheless gradually lose its dominating position in the economy of the capitalist world and would assume a position of "first among equals."

Representatives of this approach to the prospects of the development of the system of international relations have noted that a reduction of the economic disparity between the USA and the two other "centers of power" in the capitalist world will lead to significant changes in their political relations. With respect to Western Europe, for example, Z. Brzezinski wrote in 1973 that "it is being established as a political force," "is developing its own political view of the world," and there is no reason to think it probable during the next ten years Western Europe will be able to become a source of great source of "great tension and more significant conflict with the United States than those states with which we now have primarily antagonistic relations."<sup>12</sup>

Points of view like this led to the corresponding goal-directed recommendations regarding tasks of U.S. foreign political strategy for the 1970's. These recommendations from this same Z. Brzezinski and also from such specialists in international affairs as, for example, Henry Owen (Brookings

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Institute) and George Ball, Deputy Secretary of State in the governments of Kennedy and Johnson, consisted primarily in that the United States must make a much greater impact on the development of relations with western Europe as a potentially politically integrated unit and Japan whose influence is increasing.

The monograph of the Brookings Institute entitled "The Next Phase in Foreign Policy" formulated the main long-term goal of the United States as follows: "To create an active community of developed nations which would include the United States, Western Europe and Japan should be our primary task. Economics is the area in which such a community would most probably take on certain features."<sup>13</sup>

This emphasizes how important it is for the United States to concentrate foreign political efforts within the framework of precisely this "political and economic triangle" and not in a "military and political" one. Moreover, during this period of time American proponents of such an approach thought that the United States should not be against a "natural" relative reduction of the U.S. political role within the framework of this "triangle." In all of the statements on this subject by Z. Brzezinski, H. Owen and people with similar opinions they relied consistently on raising the level of equality of Western Europe and Japan with respect to the U.S. in the development and adoption of the most important foreign political decisions and on the creation not only of a mechanism of regular political consultation within the "triangle," but also on "general political planning."<sup>14</sup>

Such an approach on the part of the aforementioned specialists kept in mind both the actual alignment of forces which existed in 1973 between the U.S. and its main capitalist competitors and those predictions that were made at that time concerning the medium-range and long-range future. At that time many American politicians were impressed by Japan's growth rates which were unusually high for the capitalist world and also certain achievements on the part of countries of the European Economic Community (whose members increased 6 to 9 in 1973). These American political scientists were more ready than ever before to recognize the equality of their allies. This was also a result of the consequences of those defeats (the greatest was in Vietnam) which the U.S. sustained on the world arena when claiming the role of the single leader of the capitalist world. But within several months events took place which were in no way anticipated by any predictions of American specialists in international affairs.

The war in the Near East in October 1973, the energy crisis, the world crisis of the capitalist economy of 1974-1975 and a number of other important events (mainly in the political and economic sphere), on the one hand, contributed to further concentration of the attention of American specialists on relations among leading capitalist countries and, on the other, led the United States to regard the possible hierarchy of these relations in a different way. It became obvious to them that, despite a certain



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

reduction in the disparity in economic might and political influence between the United States and the leading countries of Western Europe and Japan, these countries could not do without reliance on the United States in situations that are most critical for the capitalist world both economically and politically.

In 1976 this same Brzezinski emphasized that neither Western Europe nor Japan was prepared to deal with either traditional or new global problems as "equals" with the United States.

He noted that of all the developed capitalist countries only the United States could submit far-reaching proposals to the UN regarding the creation of a "new economic policy," while France, trying to take the initiative in 1976-1975 in solving the problem of providing the world capitalist economy with raw material, was forced to look constantly to the U.S. "The economic difficulties experienced by developed industrial (capitalist--A.K.) countries, especially because of the rise in prices of oil produced by OPEC, emphasized in the important economic and political role of the United States, assigning it an undoubtedly more fundamental position than it had during almost 20 preceding years."<sup>15</sup>

Such an eminent American specialist in the area of economic strategy as Fred Bergsten considers this problem in the same foreshortened time segment. He thinks, in particular, that since a period of stagnation has come in the development of integration processes in the EEC because of the collapse of the notion of creating a "currency finance union," the United States will again break out in front\* as compared to other "centers of power" of the capitalist world.<sup>16</sup> On the whole the idea that the United States will emerge from the crisis with relatively fewer losses than the other countries and thus strengthen its positions vis a vis its partners-competitors is being advanced ever more frequently by American political scientists.

J. Nye, for example, notes that in the second half of the 1970's the dollar remains the "key currency" of the western world, despite the fact that the entire currency and finance system of capitalism has undergone significant changes and is no longer controlled, as before, by the United States. Nye also emphasizes that the U.S. economy is three times more powerful than

\*At the same time Bergsten draws attention to the marked strengthening of the economy of the FRG within the framework of the Western European economy. "Economically, West Germany has become not only a European, but a world power," he emphasizes. Because of this Bergsten recommends stabilizing the situation in the world capitalist economy and in political relations of the capitalist world--primarily on the basis of cooperation: the American dollar and the West German Mark. (Bergsten, C. F., New Era, New Issues -- Economic Impact, 1975, p 17).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

that of Japan and four times more powerful than the conomy of the FRG-- their closest competitors and that the superiority of the United States over other capitalist states in the military and political area remains absolute.

All this enables J. Nye to draw the conclusion that, although the "traditional hierarchy of states has weakened," the U.S. can remain at the top of this hierarchy (of states of the nonsocialist world), even if it is no longer "capable of hegemony."<sup>17</sup>

One should recognize that there is a certain amount of justification for such hopes. What with the increased dependency of all developed capitalist countries on foreign sources of raw material and the sharp increase in prices of raw materials, the position of the U.S., which has its own raw material base, looks relatively more favorable, particularly in the long-range future. American political scientists also note that under the conditions of the military and political crises, the United States will be less vulnerable to interruptions in supplies of imported raw materials than western European countries or Japan will be.

Thus is the American economy depends on imports to satisfy only one-third of its need for oil, Japan imports almost 100 percent and the countries of western Europe--an average of 97 percent. Even with accelerated development of petroleum deposits of the North Sea, this will cover no more than 15-20 percent of the needs of western Europe by 1980. The picture is approximately the same with respect to other main kinds of raw material for industry: while the United States depends on imports for an average of 15 percent, western Europe imports 75 percent and Japan, 90 percent.

There are also certain differences in the geography of the sources of imported raw material: most of the petroleum for Japan and western Europe comes from the Near East; for the U.S. a considerable proportion of the imported petroleum comes from Venezuela and Canada. Canada and the countries of Latin America are also sources of many other kinds of raw material for American industry. The main region for importing non-energy raw material for western Europe is Africa and for Japan--Asia and Australia.

At the same time American authors emphasize that of all this group of developed countries only the United States has the corresponding armed forces (primarily naval) which could "ensure the protection of sea communications" during wartime. This thus emphasizes the direct dependence of the countries of western Europe and Japan on "military support" from the U.S. even under conditions of one regional conflict or another and not just a "central" conflict directly on the European continent.\* It is

\*It is significant that it is precisely in the U.S., with the selective petroleum boycott and the sharp increase in petroleum prices, that there is public discussion of the probability of armed seizure of the petroleum deposits of the Arab countries.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

natural that all these kinds of predictions and calculations play into the hands of the hegemonistic ideas of American foreign policy.

Everything that has been said clearly shows that the idea of creating a "community with equal rights" in the form of a "political and economic triangle" of the U.S.-the EEC-Japan--is gradually subsiding into the background. Moreover the "triangle" itself is looking increasingly doubtful (as was noted above, Bergsten, for example, talks about strengthening U.S. ties not with all of the EEC, but primarily with the FRG).

In all American ideas about predictions of establishing a "community of developed industrial countries" there are also many weak places. But the central problem which is not solved in any of these variants of such a policy, regardless of how skillful it may be, is the problem of inter-imperialist contradictions in both the economic and political spheres.

The Marxist-Leninist approach to the problem of interimperialist contradictions under conditions of increased power of the forces of socialism requires a concrete accounting for the relationship between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in the capitalist world which are an objective factor in the policy of any imperialist state.

Considering the specific international political situation in the middle of the 1970's, one can state that U.S. relations with their major partners in the capitalist world stabilized to some degree (when Western Europe and Japan did not have enough strength to decisively challenge the United States). At the same time it seems that such a stabilization is particularly temporary and unstable to the degree that not a single serious American researcher can now bring himself to predict the possibility of radical improvement in future American-Western European or American-Japanese relations.\* Moreover, many of them note that a number of new problems have appeared in the international arena, in terms of which western European countries and Japan are adhering to a line that is at cross purposes with the course of the United States.

Under these conditions the very idea of a "political and economic triangle" with equal rights was deprived of any real political or economic basis.\*\*

\*See, in particular: Atlantis Lost: U.S. European Relations After the Cold War, N.Y., 1976. Not one of the ten eminent American theoreticians represented in this collection (including S. Hoffman and Z. Brzezinski) believes in the probability of a cardinal improvement in American-West European relations.

\*\*In this connection one cannot but pay attention to the predictions that have appeared recently which depreciate the future economic role of Japan which, as a result of the world crisis of the capitalist economy in 1976-1975, lost much of her "dynamism" and had to face fully the most critical economic problems. (See, for example: Ranero, R. The Pacific Basin. An Overview of Economic and Political Factors. RPA Series, N 3/75, May 1975, pp 35-36.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

True, some U.S. theoreticians, having understood the hastiness of their ideas of this "triangle" of the U.S.--the EEC--Japan as a system of tri-lateral political and economic cooperation still try to insist on the idea of this "triangle" if only in its ideological aspect, emphasizing the need for "solidarity of actions" of the main representatives of "western civilization" in the face of the "attack of international communism." This idea was developed very persistently in 1975-1976 by the U.S. Secretary of State at that time, Henry Kissinger. But even on this plane where the community of class interests of the countries of capitalism is undoubtedly manifested with special force, the partners of the U.S. are no longer displaying their former zeal to render unconditional support to the U.S. which would make it easier for the latter to maneuver in the political "triangle" or, as it is called, the "triangle of rivalry" (USSR--USA--PRC).

The rebuff with which Washington's policy of detente was met in the capitals of a number of countries of western Europe, the clearly expressed readiness of the governments of these countries to implement the provisions of the Final Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the development of contacts between the EEC and the CEMA, the negative attitude of many influential factions in the ruling circles of western European countries toward Washington's intervention in the intrapolitical struggle in these countries--all this shows the stronger independence and initiative of the foreign policy of these countries. And this, in turn, makes the implementation of hegemonistic American schemes presented under the label of "equal rights" even less realistic.

#### Variants of the Systems of "Regional Multipolarity"

In connection with the U.S. loss of a number of international positions and the manifest crisis in their global strategy, many American international affairs experts are turning their attention to the need to strengthen U.S. positions in individual regions, trying this way to find a combination of forces in one region of the world or another which are most advantageous for the U.S. ruling circles.

On the whole this variant of the future system of international relations could be called (in keeping with the classification presented at the beginning of the chapter) a system of "regional multipolarity."

U.S. academic and political circles began to discuss most actively various variants of the development of this system and especially of its subsystems in 1972-1973. In the first stage of the appearance of predictions of "regional multipolarity" they first turned their attention to the appearance of regional "balances of forces" comprised mainly of the same components that comprised the global "pentagonal" structures considered above.

Thus, in particular, in keeping with this approach it was predicted that China would have an extremely appreciable role, although not a world role but a regional one with Japan's necessary participation in the "local

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

balance", "strengthening its position vis a vis the Soviet Union and the United States which would gradually lose their influence although it would remain on a fairly high level for sometime to come."<sup>18</sup>

Japan's influence in this zone, as predicted by American specialists, should spread in the 1980's not only because of economic and other kinds of penetration into the countries of this region, but also as a result of the formation of something like the European Economic Community under the aegis of Japan. Thus Japan's influence in the Pacific Ocean-Asiatic region (as predicted by H. Kahn, for example) could surpass the influence of the United States even in the next 10-20 years.<sup>19</sup>

From the standpoint of U.S. interests the undesirability of the evolution of the situation in Asia in this direction is obvious and many American researchers have turned their attention to this circumstance. They have warned U.S. political leadership about this. The eminent American political scientist, Morton Halperin, for example, stated: "American officials must recognize that American-Japanese relations are more important for them even than relations between the U.S. and China. Japan's hostility toward the United States in the 1970's will be a greater threat to American security than the policy of China. And economic relations between the United States and Japan are considerably more essential than anything that can be achieved on this plane with China." Therefore Halperin insists that all "future measures on the part of the U.S. with respect to China should be undertaken only after consultation with Japan and should include an evaluation of how the problem of China affects Japan's intrapolitical situation."<sup>20</sup>

American researchers assign the same kind of role of "regional balancers" for the other region of the world to countries of Western Europe where they, together with the USSR and the U.S., are to form another "regional political configuration." Thus proponents of this view of the future structure of international relations recognize the preservation of the global role of only the Soviet Union and the United States in international affairs.

But while recognizing this kind of role for the Soviet Union (along with the U.S.), American theoreticians still try to combine this recognition with recommendations to Washington which are directed toward preventing the Soviet Union from increasing its strength both in the European-Atlantic and in the Pacific Ocean-Asiatic region. In particular, while estimating highly the possibilities of strengthening the role of the Soviet Union in the Pacific Ocean zone not only in terms of military-political, but also in terms of political-economic parameters,\* certain U.S. specialists are

\*Through the development of the resources of Siberia and the Far East and the activation of foreign economic ties between the Soviet Far East and Japan, Canada, the U.S. and countries of Southeast Asia.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

making a number of recommendations for U.S. foreign policy which would limit Soviet influence in this region even by strengthening the positions of the main competitor, U.S.--Japan, and also through developing relations along the line of U.S.--PRC.\*

An increasing number of U.S. bourgeois scientists in their investigations of the role of "regional forces" in future international relations go even further and think that, in a number of regions of the world, the influential "regional forces" along with the major five "centers of power," will be states that are capable of exerting essential influence on the situation in their region, including influence on the positions of the leading powers. Among these countries they include India--for Southern Asia; Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel--for the Near East; Brazil and Argentina--for Latin America; Australia--for the southern part of the Pacific Ocean basin; the Republic of South Africa--for South Africa, and so forth.<sup>21</sup>

As one can see from this list, the majority of the new regional "centers of power" are developing countries. So that an analysis of the predictions of the growth of these new influential subjects of international relations is of considerable interest from the standpoint of understanding the U.S. approach to the role of developing countries in future international relations as a whole.

The number of predictions on this subject in American research has increased considerably in recent years, especially since the end of 1973. And while before this time certain bourgeois scientists in the United States criticized with some justification both political scientists and American foreign political leadership for underestimating this problem, at the present time it is clearly one of the primary ones in the process of conceptual interpretation of long-range problems facing the ruling circles of the U.S.

The most serious bourgeois researchers are increasingly considering these problems not so much on the plane of a transfer of the center of gravity of "world confrontation" from the axis of "West--East" to the axis of "North--South" as, to an ever increasing degree, on the plane of a more differentiated attitude toward various regions and individual countries that are included in the category of developing countries.

In this connection it is significant that they divide developing countries into the "third world" and "fourth world" and even the "fifth world," as J. Ball<sup>22</sup> did in his last work, instead of including all these countries into the single category of "third world" which was the case in bourgeois political literature up until recently.

\*For more details about this see: "Politika SShA v Azii" [U.S. Policy in Asia," Moscow, "Nauka", 1977.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In keeping with the new classification, a number of bourgeois political scientists include among countries of the "third world" those developing countries which have large supplies of minerals and the corresponding human resources. On the basis of exports of raw materials, which are becoming increasingly advantageous what with the rise in prices or the establishment of new prices for raw materials, these countries are capable of accelerating their economic development and, in a number of areas, "challenging" developed capitalist countries. These political scientists assert that the most typical example of this category of countries is provided by the developing countries that export petroleum--OPEC members.

The "fourth world" includes the remainder of developing countries which are extremely varied in terms of their socio-economic and demographic indicators but which are united by the fact that on their territories there are no large supplies of minerals that are of significant interest to the world capitalist economy, primarily the economy of the U.S.\* Therefore the economic development of this group of countries is a considerably more difficult matter for bourgeois scientists than the development of countries of the "third world."

Therefore in the majority of prognosticatory investigations it is recommended that the main attention be devoted precisely to the emerging "centers of force of the middle level" and that they be considered while they are being utilized in an area that is advantageous for the United States.

G. Liska, for example, recommends that American political leadership create regional "balances of power," relying precisely on these kinds of "centers of power" in the corresponding regions, even helping them (within certain limits) to increase their influence in the region by suppressing other smaller states which are thus less important for U.S. interests.<sup>23</sup>

The most indicative approach on the part of American political scientists to the future "center of power" of the middle level consist in their long-term predictions about the development of Brazil and their corresponding recommendations.

The immense territory of this country, its rich natural resources, its large population and its high rates of economic development--all these place Brazil in a special position not only among the Latin American countries, but also in all of the "third world." Evaluating Brazil's

\*J. Howe, a leading worker of the research organization called "Council for Overseas Development," includes in the "fourth world" 46 developing countries, of which 25 (according to UN evaluation) are among the least developed in terms of their level of per capita income, illiteracy and level of industrialization (see: Howe, J.W. "Power in the Third World," JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Fall, 1975, pp 114-115).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

future, Z. Brzezinski wrote: ". . . most likely Brazil will enter or already has entered the process of transformation into a leading force in Latin America and, obviously, into a source of future tension in this region. Brazil will crowd the United States out of Latin America in the extremely near future. So this element should be an important consideration in determining American relations with Latin American states."<sup>24</sup>

When developing his ideas about Brazil in the more distant future, Brzezinski noted that this country has greater chances of becoming a new "super-power" than Japan because of its optimal combination of population, resources, geographical location, and so forth.

Other American specialists in Latin America also rate Brazil's potential role highly. Thus Robert Alexander, President of Rochester University, writes: "At least by the end of the century Brazil will be one of the leading powers of the world. Its population will reach 200 million and it will be one of the main industrial countries of the world. In all probability it will become a nuclear power. It is unlikely that Brazil will refrain from using her economic, political and military might."<sup>25</sup> The director of the Center for Latin American Studies of John Hopkins University, Riordin Roett, considered it necessary to note that in his opinion Brazil is a "serious candidate" for becoming one of the great powers. He thinks that historically Brazil is already prepared for her future role and that the growth of this country's power will most likely be accompanied by a "more aggressive and autonomous foreign policy."<sup>26</sup>

What conclusions do American specialists draw on the basis of these predictions of Brazil's development?

The most commonly shared conclusion consists in the need for the political leadership of the United States to recognize the growing role of this state in Latin America and also more broadly in the region of the South Atlantic before Brazil herself forces the United States to do this. And having recognized this, the U.S. must contribute to a certain degree to strengthening her influence in the region in areas which, in the final analysis, are most advantageous for the U.S. One of these areas can be considered to be the newly advanced idea of creating a kind of NATO in the South Atlantic--a regional military and political organization without the direct participation of the U.S., in which Brazil would play a leading role. The direction of this idea is fairly obvious: the projected block would be called upon to serve as a means of suppressing national liberation movements in South America and South Africa.

Those in the U.S. who defend this idea clearly have in mind primarily the community of class interests of American and Brazilian monopolistic circles and of a number of other Latin American countries and the UAR which would be included in the new block.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It seems, however, that if this union were ever to be created in one form or another it does not at all follow that it would necessarily be fully responsible to American intentions. The community of class interests of potential participants in the new block and those of the United States does not preclude the possibility of the appearance of situations of critical conflict in their interrelations, related primarily to the competition for regional influence and, apparently, the conflict between Brazil as the proposed "regional leader" and the United States could become much more complicated and critical than, say, the situation which exists in the relations between the U.S. and Japan and the U.S. and Western Europe.\*

It is quite obvious that the predicted U.S. reliance on new "centers of power" of the Brazil type in and of itself will in no way contribute to an overall reduction of international tension. Such a policy, on the contrary, is more likely to be an impetus for stepping up the regional arms race.

And taking into account the possibility that certain regional "centers of power" will acquire their own nuclear weapons, one might fear that new centers of the most critical international conflicts will appear to the degree that their danger goes beyond regional frameworks.

#### The "Polyarchic" Model

Even during that period of the 1970's when many American international affairs specialists were discussing the future structure of the "multi-polar" world, in the U.S. there appeared works which drew attention to other aspects of the development of the system of international relations in the 1970's and 1980's and beyond.

The authors of these works, recognizing that since the end of World War II the structure of relations in world politics has undergone large changes, thought that international relations of the future would be neither "bi-polar" nor "pentagonal" but would gradually take on a less clearly defined configuration. This system of international relations with many active subjects whose interests with respect to a large group of problems are interwoven is called "polyarchic" by a number of American authors, that is,

\*Regarding this problem in a broader, social content, one can fully agree with Prof. G. Mirskiy, who writes that "the formation even of capitalist relations in a number of countries of the 'third world' will not lead automatically to the strengthening of the world capitalist 'center'; 'centers' of international capitalism will still have to deal with the problems of the 'periphery,' even that part with itself is proceeding along the capitalist path." (Mirskiy, G., "The Changing Face of the 'Third World'," KOMMUNIST, 1976, No 2, p 115).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

under the influence of a number of independent "centers" and their diverse interests.

This group of American scholars thinks that the persistent tendencies in the changes of the concept of "power" in international relations is the source of the "erosion" of the hierarchical structure of the relations among states.

Simon Brown, one of the leading workers of the Brookings Institute, considers the relative reduction of the role of the military factor in the state's foreign policy to be one of the essential features of the emerging new international system. In the opinion of this author, military force and its direct application in this system of international relations will play an important role in local conflicts and its application in these kinds of conflicts will be increasingly short-lived with increasingly limited (tactical) military and political goals. On the whole, S. Brown concludes, "Military force will not have any practical application in daily political transactions."<sup>27</sup>

The eminent American investigator, Stanley Hoffman, who was already mentioned above, considers the changeover to the new nature of political relations to the changeover in foreign policy from a game on one strategic and diplomatic chessboard to a game on many chessboards at the same time. In his words, this is partially the result of the "nuclear blind alley" and also a product of economic and social processes and scientific discoveries in a world which is "interested in economic growth."<sup>28</sup>

A reduction of the role of the military factor in the future, not only on the nuclear level, but also on the level of ordinary armed forces, is related by certain American investigators to the fact that the Soviet Union is "expanding its global possibilities in subnuclear military technology."<sup>29</sup> And just as the USSR has managed to equal American strategic forces with the might of its nuclear missile forces, thus changing the significance of the military factor in international relations, so in the area of ordinary nonnuclear armaments it will be able to achieve the same thing in the near future. These authors have in mind primarily the Soviet naval fleet which has entered ocean expanses and "shown its flag" in regions of the world which in the past were under the exclusive control of naval forces of the U.S., Great Britain and other capitalist countries. In this connection, these authors continue, the growing possibilities of the use of Soviet military power on a global scale have a tendency to impede potential American military action at various points on the globe; for example, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea forces the United States government to think twice before taking any action like the landing in Lebanon."<sup>30</sup>

These remarks show new features of the thinking of a number of serious bourgeois international affairs experts who have been able to rise above

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the propagandistic cliches about increased "Soviet military threat," which are still widespread and are constantly being renewed in U.S. academic and political circles, and arrive at an evaluation of the existing parity of the military potentials of the two leading powers as a factor contributing to the stabilization of modern international relations.

Relying to a certain degree on such ideas about neutralization of American military power by the military power of the Soviet Union, these authors justifiably speak about the extremely probable increase in the role of non-military factors in international relations--multifaceted trade and economic activity, scientific-technical and cultural ties.

These authors and also many other specialists, with a certain amount of justification, draw attention to the growing role in world politics of global human problems which in their essence require large-scale cooperation among countries, including countries which represent various socio-economic systems and political groupings. These problems include rational utilization of natural resources, protection of the environment on a world wide and on a regional scale, the assimilation of the resources of the Pacific Ocean, the fight against diseases, the solution of the world food problem, and so forth.

"Recent years have demonstrated the growth of the number and spectrum of problems on the foreign policy agenda. Moreover, traditional ideas about national security do not correspond to the new conditions. Protection from military threats will remain a major problem in foreign policy, but national security can also be threatened by events outside the military and political sphere. The melting of the Arctic ice cover, the destruction of the ozone layer, the leakage of radioactive wastes or the relentless growth of the world population can threaten the security of Americans (and other peoples) just as seriously as events which might arise in the traditional military and political area," write Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.<sup>31</sup>

S. Brown thinks that the increased importance of these problems and problems like them will lead to an erosion of all existing coalitions that have been organized on the principle of coincidence of military and political interests of states. In this connection he takes a stand against ideas of global or regional "balances of power." He also warns against overestimating the potential of various combinations of countries that export raw materials and are formed to a considerable degree after the example of OPEC. Brown thinks that these cartels will not be formed stably enough to take on the role of consolidated subjects of international relations since each member of such coalitions will have strong ties with countries beyond its borders (political, economic, scientific-technical, and so forth) which will literally dissect the unions formed on the basis of any kind of particular interest.<sup>32</sup>

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Brown predicts a general growth of interconnections among individual nations and states in terms of an increasing group of problems, both traditional and new ones. Taking this into account, he calls upon American diplomacy to be more flexible and refined, to pay attention to the entire complex of scientific and technical factors, and to rely less on crude military force.

The growing interdependence among states and the diversification of their international activity, mainly under the influence of the scientific and technical revolution which leads to a transformation of the structure of relations in the world, are also noted in the works of a number of other bourgeois American researchers. This subject is the leitmotif of the works that became known in 1974-1975 in the U.S. and other capitalist countries such as "The Management of Interdependence" by Mariam Kemps, the speech of the American Association for Assistance to the U.N., "Science and Technology in the Age of Interdependence" by Richard Falk, "Modernization and Transformation of International Relations" by Edward Morse, "Goals for Mankind," and a number of others.<sup>33</sup>

All of these works of bourgeois international affairs experts recognize the increased vulnerability of the United States with respect to the external world and contain suggestions regarding optimal defense strategy, from the point of view of the interests of American imperialism, and in many cases also anti-offensive strategy, which under all conditions is oriented toward at least the retention of the socioeconomic and political status quo in the world. Moreover, in the majority of the aforementioned works the authors mask ideas about retaining or restoring U.S. "leadership" with concerns about "general human interests in an interdependent world."

In particular, in a speech entitled "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence"<sup>34</sup> a professor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Bloomfield, emphasizes the impossibility of cardinal changes in the area of eliminating U.S. dependency on the outside world. As a result, L. Bloomfield concentrates attention on the way the United States could most painlessly adopt to the existing situation and even take advantage of it for a certain improvement in its international positions.

L. Bloomfield sees a threat to the long-range interests of the U.S. in the attempts on the part of certain American circles to achieve self-sufficiency. He calls upon the American government to be guided by "norms of moderation, cooperation and reduction of tension." He comes out against those postulates of foreign policy which were advanced by the Republican administration of President R. Nixon and oriented the U.S. toward a struggle for obtaining unilateral advantages, toward conducting "trade wars with allies," confrontation with countries that produce raw materials, and so forth.

In Bloomfield's opinion, counteractions by interest countries would cause significant harm to American interests what with the increased vulnerability of the U.S; moreover, this course would threaten the process of detente

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

which is vitally necessary for the U.S. if it understands, finally, the limitedness of its possibilities in the world arena, particularly with respect to the confrontational aspects of its policy.

L. Bloomfield is in favor of taking the following measures:

"modest" and gradual elimination of those political circumstances in the U.S. which most greatly threaten the enlistment of countries in any new conflicts, including a certain (already partially carried out) reduction of the U.S. "naval presence";

a reduction in the level of the overall U.S. "limited presence" in the economic sphere (both state and private) through the exercise of direct governmental control over all kinds of limited investments, similarly to the way American foreign economic ties with socialist countries are regulated; on the whole--to spread the system of state regulation of the activity of monopolies that exists within the U.S. to the sphere of international activity of transnational cooperations;

the conclusion of a series of international agreements for trade in raw materials which fix the prices, volumes and conditions for sale, which would mean a departure from the present practice which relies on purely market mechanisms in international trade in raw materials;

expansion of ties between the U.S. and major exporters of petroleum by enlisting them in portfolio and even direct investments in the American economy and increasing the sales of American machines, equipment, and "know how" to these countries.

Bloomfield does not stop at calling for more active consultations among leading developed capitalist countries on a permanent basis (as other American political scientists have done before him repeatedly); he also considers it inadmissible for the United States to take unilateral uncoordinated steps. He is in favor of strengthening direct and indirect support from the United States for Japan and major Western European countries in order to reinforce the regional influence of the latter by taking advantage of the "diplomatic aktivs" of these countries in the corresponding spheres of international relations.

S. Brown also devotes much attention to U.S. relations with developing capitalist countries "under new conditions of interdependence." He should apparently be considered to be one of the main proponents of the idea of the "polyarchic system." He emphasizes that during the entire foreseeable future the U.S. should proceed from the idea, that despite a possible improvement in the economic indicators of its major capitalist partners in the future, the main source of international political influence of the latter will continue to be their position in world trade while the United States will remain the main source of capital, the country with the largest gross national product, the most advanced technology and "know how" and, consequently, the actual leader of the "western world." But Brown, like

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Bloomfield, considers this "leadership" not from the standpoint of strengthening one hierarchy or another in international relations, but from the point of view of new nonmilitary "parameters of force and influence," whose acquisition and development should become the primary task for the U.S.

Thus they are speaking about taking into account as much as possible all aspects of relations in the new "polyarchic world" and the best way of utilizing them in the U.S. "national interest."

When evaluating the predictions and ideas of the development of the system of international relations that are considered in this chapter, one can note that in a relatively short time interval (approximately since the end of the 1960's) extremely marked advancement has been made in the leading directions of American bourgeois research on the problems under consideration. The evolution of these ideas proceeded, to a significant degree, along the path of complication of ideas about the future system of international relations both in the sense of the possible organization of the system itself and in the sense of accounting for an increasingly broad group of factors that influence its functioning. A decisive influence on the formation of these ideas was exerted by further advancement in the alignment of forces between capitalism and socialism in favor of the latter, successes of developing countries in strengthening not only their political, but also their economic role in the world arena and also the crisis of the world capitalist economy in 1974-1975 which was the most profound in all of postwar history.

"The sharp reduction of production and the increased unemployment in the majority of capitalist countries," noted L. I. Brezhnev in his accountability report to the 25th CPSU Congress, "were interwoven with serious repercussions for the world capitalist economy as the currency, energy and raw material crises. Inflation made the processes of the crises even more acute. Activated by constantly growing military expenditures, it reached dimensions that were unprecedented in peace time."<sup>35</sup>

The circumstances of this crisis again clearly reveal the essence of the imperialist foreign policy which is determined not by any diffuse "national interest," but by the class structure of the capitalist state and the interests of the ruling monopolistic circles.

The greatest shock to the world capitalist economy during the entire postwar period along with the weakening of U.S. international political positions almost everywhere and the considerable erosion of their positions as an economic leader of the capitalist world caused the ruling circles of the U.S. to deal more seriously with the problem of coordinating economic, political and military aspects of the foreign political activity of the American state, devoting increasing attention to central economic problems.\*

\*In this connection, the former U.S. trade minister, P. Peterson, rephrasing a well-known statement of Clemenceau ("War is too serious a matter to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The ideological basis of the U.S. foreign political strategy also was given a new impulse (for more detail about this see chapter VII).

As a result, in the U.S. academic elite that is closest to the country's ruling circles, if there was no real unity of views (incidentally, internally they are fairly contradictory and much is still unclear), at least the differences in the ideas of the emerging new structure of international relations were reduced somewhat. Here it is worth giving special mention to the rebirth of ideas about the "inevitability of the U.S. retaining leadership" with respect to Western Europe and Japan although, of course, this leadership is now interpreted in a different way than it was in the 1950's. American theoreticians also achieved a certain unity of opinions regarding the issue that within the system of international relations of the United States priority should be given to relations with states of the "same type of civilization" and, as was noted above, actually on the basis of American superiority.

Still, the picture of future American relations that is drawn by official American political scientists is such that it automatically leads to the idea that the main way of supporting U.S. foreign political interests should be the policy of a "balance of forces," that is, a policy based on the traditional imperialist principle: "divide and conquer." Such an approach is especially typical of predictions of the evolution of international relations (in keeping with U.S. policy) with countries of the "third world."

On the whole, the normative aspect of the majority of American predictions of the evolution of international relations is subordinated to the goal of retaining the socioeconomic status quo in the world by allowing a certain restructuring of the hierarchy of relations in the capitalist world. This restructuring is envisioned in the form of its complication, the appearance of new levels and elements (in particular, division of developing countries into the "third world" and the "fourth world"). American forecasters also allow the possibility of a certain reduction in the distance between the U.S. and individual states or blocks of states of the nonsocialist world, although it is not as significant as imagined by many American political scientists even two or three years ago.

But the most typical feature of American analysts engaged in predicting the evolution of international relations in the future up to the end of this

be left to the generals."), stated: "Trade is too important a problem for its solution to be entrusted to ministers of trade, and finances are too important their problems to be solved by finance ministers, and, no doubt, energy problems are too important for their solutions to be left only in the hands of ministers of energy." (Peterson, P., The New Politics of the Emerging Global Economy. -- Pacem in Terris III, Wash, Wash., October 8-11, p 6).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

century and beyond consists in that they essentially always try to circumvent the problem of the development of relations between the two social systems--socialist and capitalist--and in their predictions the least attention of all is paid to precisely the social and class future that is related to the competition of these two systems. And of course they remain in the positions of their class; especially its monopolistic elite.

But, obviously, it is precisely because of the need to construct "variants of the future" that are purely optimistic for this class that bourgeois theoreticians deal completely abstractly with those aspects of the world class antagonism which comprise the axis of modern international relations, since a realistic account of these factors would inevitably reveal how far-fetched and unilaterally tendentious their schemes and constructs are.

FOOTNOTES

1. SALT: Problems and Prospects, N. Y., 1973, 23-25.
2. Op. cit., p 23-24.
3. W. Kintner, "Arms Control for Five-Power World," In: SALT--Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's, Pittsburgh, 1973, p 172.
4. NEW YORK TIMES, 1974, July 30.
5. J. Newhouse, Cold Down. The Story of SALT, N.Y., 1973, p 271.
6. SALT: Problems and Prospects, N. Y., 1973, p 25.
7. R. A. Scalapino, Asia and Major Powers. Implications for International Order, Washington, 1972, p 18.
8. W. Kintner, Op. cit., p 173-174.
9. S. Hoffman, "Weighing the Balance of Power," In: The Great Nixon Turnround, N. Y., 1973, p 272.
10. Ibid., p 275.
11. Ibid., p 276.
12. Z. Brzezinski, "The International Community in the Next Two Decades (June 1973)," In: Appendicies. Commission on the Organization of Government for Conduct of Foreign Policy, Washington, Vol 1, 1976, p 15.
13. The Next Phase in Foreign Policy, Washington, 1973, p 356.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14. Z. Brzezinski, "The International Community . . .," p 724.
15. Z. Brzezinski, "American in a Hostile World," FOREIGN POLICY, No 23, 1976, p 93.
16. C. F. Bergsten, "New Era, New Issues," In: Economic Impact, 1975, p 16.
17. J. S. Nye, "Independence and Interdependence," FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1976, p 142-143.
18. W. Wilcox, "Forecasting Asian Strategic Environments for National Security Decision-Making," RM-6154-PR, The RAND Corp., June 1970, p. 11.
19. H. Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, N.Y., 1972, p 206.
20. The Next Phase in Foreign Policy, Washington, 1973, p 24.
21. CM.: "Second Sinoptic Context for Discussing the 1970's and 1980's," Hudson Institute, 1972; FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, March 1973, p 8; G. Liska, "The Third World: Regional Systems and Global Order," In: Retreat from Empire?, Baltimore, 1973, p 286; R. Alexander, "The Growing Gap," In: National Strategy in a Decade of Change, N. Y., 1973, p 86-87.
22. CM.: C. F. Bergsten, "The Threat from the Third World," FOREIGN POLICY, No 14, 1973; World Politics and International Economics, Washington, 1975; B. Manning, The Conduct of U. S. Foreign Policy in the Third Century, N. Y., 1976; G. Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World. An American Foreign Policy, Boston, 1976.
23. G. Liska, States in Evolution. Changing Societies and Traditional Systems in World Politics, Baltimore, 1973, p 153.
24. Z. Brzezinski, "The International Community in the Next Two Decades," In: Appendicies. Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, p 14.
25. R. Alexander, "The Growing Gap," National Strategy in a Decade of Change, Lexington, N. Y., 1973, p 87.
26. R. Roett, "Brazil Ascendant: International Relations and Geopolitics in the Late 20th Century," JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Fall 1975, p 139.
27. S. Brown, "Changing Essence of Power," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1973, p 290.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

28. S. Hoffman, "Choices," FOREIGN POLICY, No 12, 1973, p 5.
29. ORBIS, Vol XIV, No 1, Spring 1970, p 25.
30. V. Basuik, Technology, World Politics and American Policy, N. Y., 1977, p 13.
31. R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, "Organizing for Global Environment and Resource Interdependence," In: Appendicies, Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Washington, Vol VII, 1976, p 40.
32. S. Brown, "The Emerging World Polyarchy," In: The Next 25 Years, Washington, 1975, p 93.
33. CM.: M. Kemps, The Management of Interdependence, N. Y., 1974; Science and Technology in the Age of Interdependence, N. Y., 1975; R. A. Falk, A Study of Future Worlds, N. Y., 1975; Goals for Mankind, N. Y., 1977.
34. CM.: "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence," The Department of State Special Report, No 17, July 1975.
35. "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 28.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1979

11772

CSO: 1800

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTERNATIONAL

N. N. INOZEMTSEV ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow LENINSKIY KURS MEZHDUNARODNOY POLITIKI KPSS in Russian 1978 signed to press 10 Oct 78

[Table of contents and brief description of book by N. N. Inozemtsev]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: LENINSKIY KURS MEZHDUNARODNOY POLITIKI KPSS (The Leninist Course of CPSU Foreign Policy)

Publisher: "Mysl'"

Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1978

Signed to press date: 10 October 1978

Number of copies published: 42,000

Number of pages: 206

Brief Description:

In this work N. N. Inozemtsev, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics and International Relations, examines the main directions of foreign policy taken by the CPSU and shows its indissoluble connection with the basic aims worked out by V. I. Lenin. The growth of the world revolutionary process is analyzed. Questions of the further realization of detente, the reinforcement of political detente with military detente, and the strengthening of international cooperation in the field of economics are examined.

Table of Contents:

Introduction.....	3
Chapter 1. Leninist Theoretical Bases of CPSU International Policies.....	10

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 2.	World Socialism--The Decisive Factor in Social Progress. The Growth of Fraternal Friendship, Strengthening of Unity and Solidarity of the Socialist Countries.....	28
Chapter 3.	The Soviet Union and the Fight for Freedom and Independence for the People.....	56
Chapter 4.	The Policy of Peaceful Coexistence of States With Different Systems in Action. Normalization of the International Situation. The Growth of Soviet Cooperation With Capitalist and Developing Countries.....	91
Chapter 5.	The Soviet Union in the Vanguard of the Fight for Strengthening International Security, Realizing Detente and Ending the Arms Race.....	146
Chapter 6.	Socialism and the Growth of International Economic Cooperation.....	181

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1978

CSO: 1800

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

REGIONAL

BOOK ANALYZES CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM PREACHING

Moscow MUSUL'MANSKAYA PROPOVED' (Muslim Preaching) in Russian 1978 signed to press 22 Aug 78 pp 1-4, 77-80

[Annotation, table of contents, author's comments and conclusion from book published by Politizdat Publishers, 100,000 copies]

[Text] Every year the ministers of the Muslim cult deliver hundreds of sermons in the mosques. Their subject varies, but the goal is the same: to inspire believers with religious ideas, to convince them of the correctness of the Islamic dogma. In the book, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences N. Ashirov critically analyzes Muslim preaching of the last few years. Revealing their character and ideological trend, the new tendencies in the preaching activity of the Muslim ministers of the cult, the author makes concrete recommendations with regard to the methodology of the study and the criticism of the preachings, with regard to the neutralization of their influence on the consciousness of the people.

The work is written in simple, easy-to-understand language. It is intended for propagandists of scientific atheism, all those who are interested in the problems of contemporary Islam.

Table of Contents

From the Author	3
Muslim Preachment in the Past and Present	5
Explanation of the Islamic Dogma	20
Substantiation and New Interpretation of Cult Actions	37
Socio-Moral Precepts	58
Conclusion	77

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From the Author

One of the main tasks in the building of communist society is the education of the new man. His philosophy of life is formed on the basis of Marxism-Leninism as an integral and harmonious system of philosophical, economic, and sociopolitical views. The atheistic orientation is an important component part of the scientific world view of the new man, and scientific-atheistic work is an integral element of communist education.

The conception of a comprehensive approach to the organization of the entire enterprise of education, which was advanced and substantiated by the 25th CPSU Congress, opens up new perspectives for the system of atheistic education, sets tasks for its perfection and increases its effectiveness. It is impossible to solve these tasks without a deep knowledge of contemporary religious ideology and adaptive tendencies, characteristic of the various confessions. Adaptive tendencies are manifested particularly clearly in the sermon. In it both conditions of social life that have undergone change and advances in the consciousness of believers and religious leaders find distinctive reflection.

The special sermon is viewed in Islam as an integral element of the Friday and holiday worship services. However, the preaching activity of the Muslim clergy is by far not exhausted by this. In many mosques, sermons are given daily during the month of Ramadan (the month of fasting). The execution of such rites as name-giving, circumcision, marriage, and funeral also involve the teachings of mullahs. The Muslim ministers of the cult attempt to make use of every opportunity for the propaganda of religion and the strengthening of its influence on their people. Human happiness and grief, fasting and civil holidays, the beginning of the harvest and the preparation of the kolkhoz cattle for wintering--all may serve as a point of departure for the giving of a sermon by the mullah. Not only in the mosques, but also in the homes of believers, and even at the cemeteries one can hear the words of priests glorifying Allah.

The sermon is the most dynamic element of the religious complex, which opens up a broad field for maneuvering, for the perfection of argumentation and the mastering of the new problems. It is precisely with the aid of the sermon in the first place that modernistic ideas are disseminated among the mass of believers. Hence it is clear: In order to acquire a concept of the real, living Islam, it is not enough to know only the teachings of the Koran. Academician I. Yu. Krachkovskiy in his time very correctly called the attention of researchers to this. He wrote in 1918: "It is a great mistake to characterize Islam primarily or exclusively on the basis of the Koran. It hardly covers the first two decades in the development of Islam."\*

This thought is even more justified when we talk about the organization of scientific-atheistic work in our time in the regions of the traditional dissemination of Islam. It is completely insufficient to subject to criticism

\*"Koran". Translation and commentaries by I. Yu. Krachkovskiy. Moscow, 1963, p 654.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

only the teachings of the Koran; one can be taken in, hit wide of the mark, and even call forth distrust of atheist propaganda. The atheist must have a good knowledge of contemporary preaching, the forms and methods of the activity of religious organizations and the clergy. Only in this case can one count on the effectiveness of scientific-atheist education.

The present work is the result of an analysis of hundreds of sermons presented in Muslim religious associations in different regions of the country during the last two decades. The greater part of them was heard by the author himself, the other part was studied by scholars and propagandists of scientific atheism who are engaged in criticism of the Muslim ideology. To all of them the author expresses his sincere gratitude.

The research that was conducted, as presented, made it possible to expose characteristic traits of the contemporary Muslim, its direction and ideological content. And this, in turn, must be of help in the elaboration of effective ways of overcoming religious survivals.

Conclusion

The study of the preaching activity of the Muslim clergy shows that the range of questions touched on in the speeches of the preachers is rather broad. The interpretations given to the propositions of the dogmas and rites in different regions of the country have their peculiar features, which depend on the existing traditions as well as on the level of preparation of the spiritual teachers. Hundred of thousands of people daily listen to the sermons given in the mosques, to the talks in the homes of the believers given by the ministers of the cult. The preaching activity of the clergy is an important factor promoting the preservation of religion's influence on a part of the population, since for the majority of believers the preaching by ministers of the cult, their religious-moral directions, are the basic source of religious information. The content of the oral presentations by the ministers of the cult is frequently discussed in the domestic circle, which cannot but exert an influence on non-believers as well. All of this makes it incumbent upon the atheist public to have a good knowledge of the preaching activity of the clergy and to counter it with well-argued materials which reveal the real harm inflicted on the individual and society by religion in our age.

The analysis of contemporary Islamic preaching makes it possible to show to propagandists of scientific atheism the character of the modernistic interpretation of social phenomena, the ways of modernizing Muslim moral teachings, the newest methods of defending religious dogmas against the blows of scientific progress. However, one can carry out this task effectively only by comparing the contemporary practice of the clergy with the foundations of the dogmas laid down in the Koran and interpreted by the theologians of past epochs.

The demonstration of the incompatibility of many aspects of contemporary preaching with the propositions of the Koran makes it possible for propagandists of scientific atheism, too, to bring believers to the conclusion that

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

supernatural forces have nothing to do with the development of the tenets of one sort or another of the dogma and rites of Islam, that they are created by people and are changed by them in conformity with changed circumstances. Such arguments in the final analysis help believers to become convinced of the fact that the Koran is not given to people from above, but that its content reflects the views of people who lived in the 7th century in Arabia and, consequently, are limited by the framework of the time. Therefore, it does not make sense to search in the "clear book" for the principles of socialism or the norms of conduct that correspond to the demands of the moral code of the builder of communism, and it is all the more senseless to see in it the prediction of the contemporary achievements of science and technology.

An analysis of contemporary Muslim preaching in comparison with the tenets of the books of dogma and the theological elaborations of the past makes it possible for the propagandists of scientific atheism to show that the modernization of Islam is the result of a discrepancy between its dogma and cult practice and the structure of life in a socialist society, and is an attempt to adjust to this structure even at the price of rejecting a whole series of statutes.

Such an analysis convincingly reveals the antiscientific essence of religion, no matter to what changes and innovations its ministers resort, no matter how they "embellish" it.

In modernizing Islam, "erasing" and "perfecting" it in conformity with changed circumstances, some of the ministers of the cult honestly propose that it thus helps the building of communism. Acting in that way, it attempts to find "its place" in the struggle of the masses for the construction of the new society. It must be underscored that this is precisely how many believers perceive the activity of religious organizations and ministers of the cult. At times they regard with bewilderment the scientific criticism of the religion's modernization, its being brought up to date. The duty of the propagandists of scientific atheism is to introduce clarity into this question. It is very possible that some of the ministers of the cult, in adjusting Islam to the conditions of socialism, are guided by good intentions, seeing in it a means of strengthening the socialist social order and the instrument for securing moral progress. However, we judge the efforts they are making not by their subjective desires, but the objective results of their activity, which is aimed at the preservation of the influence of an antiscientific ideology on the consciousness and the conduct of Soviet people. "One must judge philosophers not by the signs which they hang on themselves," noted V. I. Lenin, "but by how they in fact solve basic theoretical questions, with whom they walk hand in hand, what they teach and what they taught their students and followers."\*

One can be an honest and conscientious person, striving to live in the name of one's people, for the sake of the prosperity of one's native country; but, all other things being equal, most in the way of the realization of this \*V. I. Lenin, "Polnoe sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collection of Works] Vol. 18, p 228.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

goal will be attained by the individual who has the best knowledge of the regularities of social development, who has deeply assimilated the scientific basis of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state--the decisions and documents of the CPSU, who has developed an active communist position of life. But can religion, including a modernized one, be the ally of an individual in the study of the regularities of social development? Can it help in the development of a scientific basis for the advancement of the country? Can it contribute to the development of an active communist position in life? There can only be one answer to these questions: No!

And what is more. The material set forth in this book convincingly, in our view, testifies to the fact that, in the solution of the questions enumerated above, religion plays the role of an obstacle, including its modernized variant. To bring this into the consciousness of the believers on the basis of a concrete analysis of the contemporary ideological and cult activity of Muslim religious organizations and ministers of the cult--that is the important task of the propagandists of scientific atheism, who are working in the regions of the traditional dissemination of Islam in our country.

A well-argued demonstration of the negative role of religion in the social development and education of the new man is a contribution to cleansing the consciousness of believers of incorrect, illusory conceptions, which opens up enormous possibilities for the formation of a scientific world view in them.

COPYRIGHT: Politizdat, 1978

8970

CSO: 1800

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

REGIONAL

BOOK ON 'SURVIVALS' OF ISLAM IN DAGESTAN REVIEWED

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI V SSSR in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 117-120

[Review by A. F. Tsyркun of the book "Ateisty v Nastuplenii: Preodoleniye Perezhitkov Islama v Natsional'nom Samosoznanii" (Atheists on the Offensive: Overcoming the Vestiges of Islam in National Self-Awareness) by I. A. Makatov, Izdatel'stvo Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow, 1978, 143 pages]

[Text] The book consists of an introduction, three chapters ("The Historical, Ideological and Social-Psychological Prerequisites of the Relationship of National and Religious Awareness," "The Dialectics of the Development of National Self-Awareness and Islam," and "The Unity of Processes of the Integration of Nationalities, International and Atheistic Indoctrination") and a conclusion. It draws on materials from sociological research in Dagestan and the Checheno-Ingush ASSR.

During the period of its spread in the Northern Caucasus, Islam put down very deep roots in the awareness, customs, and in all spheres of the social and personal lives of the mountain peoples. Having assimilated the previous beliefs, Islam not only took over their ethnic functions, but also substantially broadened them. National feelings and ideas in the spiritual world of the mountain dweller were most closely intertwined with the religious, creating a common psychological base. For the believers Islam represented an essential attribute of the given national community. The leadership of the national liberation movement was often concentrated in the mosque. The national liberation war of the mountain people in the [18]20's-[18]50's conducted under the banners of muridism and a ghazawat [Holy War] was led by the imams Ghazi-Magomed, Gamzat-Bek and Shamil'.

With the incorporation of the Northern Caucasus in Russia and the development of commodity-monetary relations here, the processes of social differentiation were accelerated and these also marked the formation and deepening of a split between Islam and the working masses, and Islam and progressive national self-awareness and the national liberation movement. The revolution radically accelerated this process. But the intermingling of the national and the religious in awareness was so strong that it has survived up to the present among a portion of the population, comprising a most important basis for the viability of Islam.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In portraying itself as the most essential and cherished aspect of national existence, Islam endeavored to use any exacerbation of national feelings for its own consolidation. For example, the author has pointed out that "the intensifying migration process is one of the factors contributing to the growth of national self-awareness among the Northern Caucasus peoples.... As sociological research has shown, in towns and rayons with a heterogeneous population there are two fold more persons who observe the Moslem holidays because they are considered a national traditions than in towns with an ethnically homogeneous population" (pp 46-47). This "to a certain degree alienates and isolates the people of different nationalities and different beliefs, particularly in the spheres of family, marriage, moral and domestic relations (p 49). This is a temporary negative aspect in the general, undoubtedly progressive, process of the internationalization of the population in the region. In the given instance, religious customs are associated with national ones.

In talking with persons who demanded that a mosque be opened in their locality, the author established that the absence of such, with places available for celebrating other rites, was viewed directly as a "national injustice" (p 52).

As a whole in the balance of the national and the religious "there is an observable trend of an ever-growing strengthening of the national component, when the religious more and more is given a national cover, and this to a certain degree intensifies the feeling of Moslem exclusiveness" (p 55). From this viewpoint "Islam among many believers in Checheno-Ingushetia and Dagestan operates not so much as a religion as a system within which the national, collective, family and moral relationships of people are shaped" (p 56). To a significant degree this explains the influence of the leaders from both the old and new Murid groups which have formed during the Soviet period and which devote a great deal of attention to organizing various aspects of the life of the believers as well as a portion of the nonbelievers in a "national Moslem" style.

One of the spheres of the intermingling of national and religious awareness is the traditional rites and rituals and also the surviving adats [traditional law]. They have been very tenacious since they "still satisfy certain vital needs of people" (p 68). Islam endeavors to give a religious content to a majority of these rites. Such are the rites of burial, marriage and so forth to which nonbelievers also resort in their canonized Islamic form.

In this regard the author has emphasized the need for an improving of the socialist rituals which would incorporate in them the old popular elements of the traditional rituals freed from an Islamic interpretation. Attempts to break abruptly with the traditional rituals often produce an undesirable effect. For example, a burial accompanied by music is viewed by Moslems as Christianization, and so forth. It is also essential to strip away the influence of Islam and support the positive adats such as respect for elders, the cult of motherhood, blood payment to prevent feuds, and so forth.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Another sphere of the existence of Islam is the national and family-kinship ties. Islam endeavors to act as their controller and protector. Many modern unregistered religious groups (for example, the Murid fraternities in Checheno-Ingushetia) are basically created along kinship lines. Islam also holds a position of mutual support for certain still found traditions (according to the given data, not only an absolute majority of the believers subject their children to the sunnet (circumcision), but also a majority of the vacillators and nonbelievers).

Islam also tries to play on patriotic, internationalistic and national feelings. Islamic activists have proclaimed as "saints" certain leaders of the national liberation struggle, particularly those exiled to Siberia or who have "fallen for their faith," they build mausoleums, vaults and even in certain instances (when such are lacking) monuments to those who fell in the Great Patriotic War, they protect historical monuments, and so forth. Sometimes the negligence of the local authorities contributes to this. The author gives examples when unique historical monuments such as mosques and churches of the 8th-10th centuries have been destroyed, used as warehouses and so forth. Their repair or use as clubs, museums would, he feels, have a substantial atheistic effect.

In the concluding chapter the author shows that the grounds for nationalistic and religious prejudices are constantly being narrowed. In addition to the change in the objective conditions of life, here an important role is also played by the unity of internationalistic and atheistic indoctrination. The local authorities are seeking out new forms and methods for such indoctrination. "The rural assemblies and councils of the aksakals have become national forms of combatting the vestiges of the past" (p 113) and here these have a traditional authority. They "are called upon the initiative of the party, soviet and social organizations when it is essential to mobilize public opinion against various antisocial phenomena or to condemn the conduct of individual fanatical believers" (p 114). With their help an offensive is being made against the old rites. For example, "realizing that it would be hard to immediately change all the old obsolete burial rituals, the aksakals, having consulted with the party organization...decided first to work for the halting of funeral feasts and the distributing of food at burials. And this was achieved" (p 120).

In conclusion emphasis is put on the need for greater tact and respect for the national and religious features of the believer, and certain recommendations are given.

COPYRIGHT: INION AN SSSR

10272  
CSO: 1800

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

REGIONAL

BOOK ON WORKING CLASS IN KIRGIZIYA REVIEWED

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI V SSSR in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 76-82

[Review by A. N. Vinogradov of the book "Rabochiy klass Kirgizstana v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma" [The Working Class of Kirgizstan Under the Conditions of Developed Socialism] by Sh. Kh. Shiriyazdanov, Institute of History, Kirgiz SSR Academy of Sciences, Frunze: Ilim, 1979, 395 pages]

[Text] The book consists of an Introduction, five chapters and a Conclusion.

The first chapter is entitled "Industrial Progress and Improving the Economic Base for the Development of the Working Class of Kirgizstan, during the Period of Developed Socialism". From 1960 - 1970, the fixed industrial and production capital of Kirgiziya grew 3.4-fold (on the whole for the USSR it was more than 2.5-fold), and the over-all volume of industrial production -- more than threefold. In the republic, such branches of industry as automobile, instrument making, electrotechnical, tool-making, gas, and glass, have sprung up. The share of the production of the means of production in the over-all volume of industrial production increased from 53 to 68 percent, significantly approaching the all-union level (73.4 percent). Labor productivity rose to 69 percent. The proportion of industry in creating the republic's national income increased from 40.1 percent in 1958 to 41.6 percent in 1970, and in gross social product -- from 49.5 percent to 55.2 percent. Kirgiziya's share in the creation of the USSR's national income grew by almost 20 percent, and in the country's industrial complex--from 0.4 to 0.6 percent (pp 103 - 107).

The second chapter is entitled "Quantitative Changes in the Composition of Kirgizstan's Working Class." During 1959 - 1970, the number of people in the republic increased from 2,065,800 to 2,932,800. During these years, just as in previous periods, Kirgiziya was the area of the most (although constantly decreasing) intensive foreign migration in the Central Asian region. To its share fell 17 percent (150,000) of the republic's over-all population growth. However, the deciding factor in the increase in the number of people was the high natural increase. The dynamic development of

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the national economy provided for fuller employment of the able-bodied population. Its level rose from 80 percent in 1959 to 91.3 percent in 1970 (pp 113-114).

The role of the peasantry as the replenishment source of Kirgiziya's working class is gradually decreasing. The number of kolkhoz workers, engaged in agriculture, decreased during the period 1959-1970 from 352,400 to 244,100 people, and the number of sovkhos workers grew from 45,500 to 100,400 people. Almost 50 percent of those released from kolkhoz production joined the ranks of workers and employees in industrial branches (p 117). The fact that--unlike previous periods--significantly more production installations were placed in average-size and small cities and in rural areas contributed to raising the employment level and changing its structure. The number of kolkhoz members, working in state industrial enterprises, grew from 5,500 in 1958 to 18,200 people, and the number of industrial workers in rural areas from 47,600 (1959) to 100,400 (pp 118-119). In 1968 villagers by birth were 48 percent of the work force in the machine building and metal working industry, and 45.5 percent in light industry (pp 118-119).

A considerable number of able-bodied people are arriving in Kirgiziya from the RSFSR (primarily from the Urals, from western and eastern Siberia, and the Far East). The immigrants, the majority of whom were village dwellers, settled mainly in cities.

The proportion of those working on home and private subsidiary farms in the republic decreased from 20 to 8.7 percent (from 178,000 to 81,600). The number of people who had reached retirement age but who continued to work increased from more than 3,200 in 1963 to almost 5,000 in 1967 (pp 125-127).

During 1958 - 1970, almost 199,00 graduates of general education schools arrived in the national economy. Whereas in 1958, 6,160 young men and girls joined the ranks of the working class, there were 27,633 in 1969. Sixty percent of those placed in jobs were accepted for work in industrial branches. The proportion of school graduates among the over-all number of those accepted in industrial enterprises increased from 11.3 percent in 1960 to 18.6 percent in 1969 (pp 130-132). As a result of the abolishment of producer cooperatives in 1959, 8,406 of their workers replenished the republic's detachment of workers and employees (p 134).

In 1963, the proportion of PTU [professional technical school] graduates among the over-all number of those accepted for work in the republic's industry was 19 percent, and in 1970-- 4.6 percent. Organized recruitment under the conditions of the Kirgiz SSR did not play a significant role. Among the workers who had signed contracts for orderly recruitment, rural inhabitants formed 43 percent in 1965, 57 percent in 1966, and 37 percent in 1970. During the years of the 8th Five-Year Plan, from 60 to 93 percent of the workers who had signed a contract were annually sent to those areas of the country where a shortage of manpower was being felt (primarily to the Yakutskaya ASSR, Khabarovskiy and Altayskiy krays, Kazakhskaya SSR, etc.).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The proportion of workers, who annually arrived in the industrial enterprises of the republic through organized recruitment, fluctuated from 0.04 percent in 1963 to 2.7 percent in 1968 (pp 136-138). During 1959-1965, more than 6,000 Komsomol members arrived at particularly important Kirgiz SSR construction projects. The most popular form for replenishing the working class (primarily slightly qualified workers) was admittance for work in individual order. In industry, this form made up in 1970 92.9 percent of the over-all admittance (98 percent in 1963) and was somewhat higher than the all-union indicator, testifying to the excessive personnel fluctuation. The transfer of workers from one enterprise to another was most widely used during the first half of the Sixties (in 1959--5.5 percent, in 1961 -- 11.5 percent) and then began to decrease (pp 142-143).

The proportion of workers within the republic's entire population rose from 40.9 percent in 1959 to 51.1 percent in 1970, and within the gainfully employed population-- from 39.7 to 53.6 percent. In industry, construction and transport and communications enterprises, the number of workers during this same period grew by a factor of 1.87; in agriculture and forestry -- by a factor of 1.83; in trade, public catering, procurement and supply -- by a factor of 2.5; and in other non-industrial branches-- by a factor of almost 2. The proportion of Kirgiziya's urban population increased from 34 to 37.4 percent (pp 146-147).

The number of industrial workers in the Kirgiz SSR during 1958 - 1970 increased by 111 percent (from 79,900 to 168,600) as opposed to 57 percent for the USSR as a whole. The proportion of workers, engaged in the branches of heavy industry, increased significantly, reaching more than 55 percent. In industry, the over-all number of engineer-technical workers grew about 2.9-fold and their proportion in the active population -- from 7 to 10 percent (as a whole for the USSR it was equal to 11.7 percent in 1970); the proportion of employees and junior service personnel decreased from 10 to 7 percent (with an absolute growth); and the proportion of workers remained stable--83 percent (for the USSR -- 81.1 percent) (pp 150-155).

In 1969, the working class of the Kirgiz SSR included representatives of 76 nationalities and peoples (in 1934--25) p 157). The number of workers, engineer-technical workers and employees of Kirgiz nationality grew more than threefold during 1957-1967 (from 55,000 to 174,600) with a twofold increase in the over-all number of workers and employees (p 160).

During 1969-1970, the number of women among workers and employees in the republic grew from 176,100 to 376,000, and their proportion--from 41 to 47 percent (p 163). The number of Kirgiz among workers, engineer-technical workers and employees increased by a factor of 4.5-fold from 1957 to 1967.

The stable growth of the proportion of workers of the most able-bodied age -- 26-49 years (in 1967, it was equal to 69.9 percent in industry) was typical of the changes in the age composition of Kirgiziya's working class.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The proportion of older workers and employees was relatively stable. In the republic, just as in the USSR on the whole, workers up to 35 years old made up more than 50 percent of all workers (pp 167-168). The number and proportion of workers, having a long period of work, increased somewhat. However, personnel fluidity was still rather high (in industry, it was almost 35 percent in 1966-1969) (p 171).

The third chapter is entitled "Changes in the Qualitative Composition of Kirgiziya's Working Class." In 1959, for every 1,000 workers in the republic there were 389 workers with a higher and secondary education, in 1970--577 (for the USSR--586). The proportion of urban workers, having a higher, secondary special, and general secondary education, rose from 42.7 to 62.3 percent (for the USSR it was 64.2 percent) (pp 183-184).

One of the main ways to solve the task of raising the cultural-technical level of the workers in the republic was the development of a professional-technical education system. During 1959-1970, the number of urban and rural professional technical schools, which prepare personnel for 39 professions, increased to 51 (24), and the number of students in them from 5,900 to 26,500 (pp. 193-194). From 1960 to 1970, the proportion of teenagers older than 18 among professional technical school students decreased from 64.9 to 25.4 percent, and the proportion of girls increased from 18.2 to 24.8 percent. The proportion of students with a complete secondary education grew from 8.4 percent in 1965 to 20 percent in 1970, and that for those with less than an eighth grade education decreased from 26.5 to 14.5 percent (pp 200-201). During 1959-1965, 31,340 qualified workers (including 18,483 for agriculture) were trained in professional technical schools, and during 1966-1970 -- 59,375 (25,862). During 1959-1961 Kirgiz formed 33.5 percent of the students in professional technical schools, and during 1966-1969 -- 55 percent (pp 212-213).

In the Kirgiz SSR,, just as in the USSR as a whole, the training of workers directly in industry plays an important role. Among the workers undergoing training in industry using the individual training method, 52.4 percent (71,800) were trained during 1959-1965, and 56.2 percent (816,000) during 1966-1969 (p 224). The number of workers and employees, who increased qualifications, grew more than 2.5-fold, reaching 166,300 (p 227).

The number of workers in the leading professions in the Kirgiz SSR grew more quickly than for the USSR as a whole. As a result, the qualification level of the republic's workers came close to the all-union level; In industry, highly qualified workers were 18.3 percent (for the USSR, the same), qualified -- 50.7 (52.7), slightly and unqualified -- 31 percent (29 percent) (p 242).

The fourth chapter is entitled "The Growth of the Production Activity of Kirgiziya's Working Class." In the Kirgiz SSR, more than 90 percent of the workers and employees as opposed to 80 percent in 1963 participated in socialist competition (pp 259 and 382), and in the movement for a communist



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

attitude toward work--more than 500 enterprises and organizations and more than 265,200 workers and employees (2.5-fold more than in 1965) (p 300). The number of inventors and rationalizers, among whom 50 percent were workers, grew 2.6-fold during the 10 years (from 7,994 to 20,920). The economy, obtained from the incorporation of rationalizer proposals, increased by more than four-fold (p 317).

The fifth chapter is entitled "The Growth of the Social and Political Activity and the Material Prosperity of Kirgizstan's Working Class." During 1960 - 1970, the proportion of workers in the republic's party organization increased from 26.5 to 33.4 percent. In 1970, more than one third of the communists worked in the industrial branches (p 326). In the Supreme Soviet of the Kirgiz SSR, the proportion of workers rose from 17.6 percent in 1959 to 23.4 percent in 1971, in local soviets -- from 13.4 to 31.2 percent (the proportion of kolkhoz members decreased from 47.2 to 36.1 percent, and of employees -- from 39.4 to 32.7 percent) (p 332). The number of those selected for continuously functioning production conferences grew 2.2-fold during the 10 years. In them, workers formed 63.4 percent in 1970 (in 1959 -- 69.1 percent) (pp 338-339).

The national income of Kirgiziya increased by a factor of 2.2 during 1960-1970 (for the USSR on the whole by 99 percent (p 366). The average monthly wages of the republic's workers and employees increased from 74.9 rubles to 112.6 rubles. The volume of public consumption funds grew by more than 2.3-fold and payments from these funds calculated on a per capita basis from 87 rubles (1959) to 203 rubles. During the years of the 8th Five-Year Plan, the real income of the republic's population rose on the average by 48 percent and calculated on a per capita basis -- by 28.2 percent (pp 369-371). The consumption of meat products grew by 11.8 percent and of dairy products -- by 16.2 percent, and the consumption of grain products decreased by 13.8 percent. According to data from an investigation of family budgets conducted by the Kirgiz SSR Central Statistical Directorate, workers' expenditures to acquire clothing, footwear and cloth made up 17.4 percent in 1952 and 20 percent in 1970, for acquiring goods of cultural and personal services significance -- 2.9 and 7.3 percent, respectively (pp 372-373). The volume of everyday services increased from 7.6 million rubles to 39.8 million. The number of doctors grew by 80 percent. The social insurance budget increased from 18.5 million to 49.5 million rubles (pp 378-379).

COPYRIGHT: INION AN SSSR

8802  
CSO: 1800

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY